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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOEL SCOTT McNEARNEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030548-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for aggravated burglary, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999), and aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Stephen L. Roth presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). See. Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting the State's request 
for general discovery. 
Standard of Review: While "a trial court is generally allowed broad discretion in 
granting or refusing discovery, see State v. Knill. 656 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah 1982), 'the 
proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the trial 
court's decision for correctness.'" State v. Sprv. 2001 UT App 75,18, 21 P.3d 675 
(quoting Ostler v. Buhler. 1999 UT 99,^5, 989 P.2d 1073). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Joel McNearney's (McNearney) argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion by granting the State's request for discovery is preserved at R. 214. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following are determinative of the issues on appeal. See Addendum B. 
U.S. Const, amend. V - Right Against Self-incrimination; 
U.S. Const, amend. VI - Right to Full Representation of Counsel; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV - Right to Due Process of Law; 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12 - Rights of Accused Persons; 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 (2003) - Rights of Defendant; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) - Work Product Doctrine; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(c) - Prosecutorial Discovery; 
Utah R. Evid. 504(b) - Attorney-Client Privilege; 
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6 - Confidentiality of Information. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
McNearney was charged by information with aggravated burglary, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999), and aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). R . 1-3; 29-31. 
On November 20,2002 and April 29,2003, defense counsel requested discovery 
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"pursuant to Rules 16 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due 
Process clauses of the constitution of the state of Utah and the United States." R. 18-19; 
86-87. Specifically, defense counsel requested evidence tending to negate or mitigate 
guilt or inculpate the defendant; recordings, reports, notes, transcripts or other written 
materials; "statements made by the defendant, co-defendant or any witnesses"; list of 
witnesses the State "intends to call," including names, addresses, and phone numbers; 
criminal records of defendant and potential witnesses; photographs, drawings, and 
diagrams; scientific reports; notice of intent to present hearsay; and any other evidence 
"the State intends to introduce at the trial." Id. 
On May 6, 2003, the prosecutor requested discovery "pursuant to Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." R. 133-35. Specifically, the prosecutor requested: 
1. Names, addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of birth of all the 
witnesses that the defense intends to call for trial; 
2. Copies of physical evidence, documents, and photographs the defense 
intends to introduce at trial or an opportunity to inspect such evidence; 
3. Copies of any reports and conclusions of any experts that the defendant 
intends to call for trial, each expert's qualifications, and information 
concerning any remuneration that the witness may be receiving for such 
testimony; 
4. Copies of any reports prepared by the defense investigators during the 
course of the investigation of this case; 
5. Copies of any reports prepared by defense investigators where the defense 
intends to call the particular investigator as a witness; 
6. Copies of that portion of any reports prepared by defense investigators 
concerning statements made by witnesses the defense intends to call at trial; 
7. Disclosure of any relationship to the defendant of any witness the defense 
intends to call at trial. 
Id at 133-34. Citing State v. Sprv. 2001 UT App 75, 21 P.3d 675, the prosecutor 
3 
claimed good cause existed to grant the request for discovery because: 
first, if the defense has truly exculpatory evidence, Ihe 
prosecution can be dealt or dismissed accordingly. Second, if 
the defense evidence is flawed, the prosecution, just like the 
defense, should be permitted to investigate such flaws and 
reveal them at trial. Third, disclosure of the above listed 
evidence is necessary for proper preparation of the State's 
case. Finally, the above listed evidence is material to the 
issues to be raised at trial. 
Id at 134-35. 
A motion hearing was held on May 6, 2003. R. 214. There, defense counsel 
objected to the State's discovery request, and explained: 
One of the problems I have with the State's motion is that the 
issue of reciprocal discovery has been discussed, debated at 
length by the rules committee. There have been proposals 
made to the Supreme Court proposing reciprocal discovery 
and those have been in fact rejected. 
R. 214: 3. Next, defense counsel argued: 
[T]he State should not go forward to trial on a case that they 
don't believe they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt. If I 
present any case whatsoever, it depends specifically on what 
the State . . . represents at trial. I don't really know until after 
they present their evidence what I'm going to present. I don't 
have any idea. My case is purely a rebuttal case, it is not a 
case in chief. I have absolutely no burden to present to the 
Court, to the jury, to anybody else. Mr. McNearney has no 
burden to prove his innocence, he's presumed innocent 
unless the State can prove him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The State has a very heavy burden and as well they 
should, in order to convict somebody and to take away their 
liberty, they should have a tremendous burden of proof and 
essentially, by requiring me to turn over this information to 
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the State, makes me a prosecutor on this case against my own 
client. 
All the information they want is information I've 
gained through the representation of my client, work product, 
privileged information, it's something I don't feel that I'm at 
liberty to disclose, number one. I think that Constitutionally, 
I can't. 
R. 214:3-4. Defense counsel then objected to the prosecutor's good cause assertions: 
I think this is an instance, the State says in its motion, 
good cause exists in this case because first, if the defense has 
truly exculpatory evidence, the prosecution can be dealt or 
dismissed accordingly. 
Obviously if there was anything . . . the defense was 
going to present that was going to lead to dismissal of 
charges, that would have done a long time . . . ago and 
probably something the State would have discovered at the 
preliminary hearing. I don't really think that's good cause, I 
think they can make that argument in every case.. . . 
Moreover, the State says secondly, if the defense 
evidence is flawed, the prosecution, just like the defense, 
should be permitted to investigate such flaws and reveal them 
at trial. 
The bottom line is that this system is not designed to 
be a level playing field and it never has been. That is the 
reason that the State carries the tremendous burden of proof, 
is because they're attempting, through their resources, 
through their investigators, through the prosecution, through 
all these things that they have access to, to take away 
someone's liberty. And as a result of that, their burden 
should be high and I should not be required to assist in that 
endeavor. 
The third . . . basis the State makes is disclosure is 
necessary for proper presentation of the State's case. Again, 
my position is, the State should not be going to trial on cases 
that they're not ready to go forward on, that they don't have 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt on. It's their burden, it's 
not my burden. 
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R. 214:4-5. In response, the prosecutor argued State v. Spry. 2001 UT App 75, 21 P.3d 
675, "is the controlling law on the courts in this State." IcL at 6. Next, she argued: 
The good cause is that we have a right to be prepared for 
trial, to be able to know if witnesses that Ms. Romero is 
going to call, whether we can impeach them, if they have 
prior criminal histories, there's many reasons, we would want 
to know any exhibits or things that she's going to introduce at 
trial. 
I think it's reasonable, although her case is mostly 
rebuttal, if she knows certain witnesses she's going to call or 
reasonably going to call, I think we have the right to that 
information. 
The . . . State's position is, it's not a trial by ambush 
anymore, that we . . . do have a right to find out some of this 
information. 
In looking at the . . . documents that [defense counsel] 
provided, I don't think it tells us anything. 
Id 
Next, defense counsel highlighted minutes from the 1993 and 1994 Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure committee meetings where the committee rejected an amendment to 
rule 16 that would have created reciprocal discovery and outlined the information Mto be 
disclosed." IcL at 7-8. Then she argued Spry, though issued after the amendment was 
rejected, does not "address[] all the issues that I'm raising today . . . work product or 
privilege and essentially, making me an adversary against my own client." Id. at 9. 
Finally, defense counsel distinguished Williams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78, 83-85 
(1970), a case "requiring defense to give notice of alibi witnesses," because: 
when we're dealing with alibi witnesses, that's a whole 
different issue. We have a specific provision dealing with 
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alibi witnesses and the reason why it's different is because 
that is a specific day and a specific time and that's very easy. 
That information essentially would dissolve the State's case, 
if it turned out to be in fact a legitimate alibi. That's the 
reason for the disclosure, is that is an absolute bar to a 
prosecution for an offense on that particular date and there's 
an understanding as to why that information would be 
necessary. 
Id. Continuing, defense counsel explained: 
The remaining items that are requested by the State in this 
case don't do the same thing. Essentially, they're saying 
we're going forward to trial, we want to be able to know . . . 
what the defense is going to present as evidence so that we 
can refute that. And . . . that's all well and good,.. . but the 
bottom line is, this is not the place where we have a level 
playing field and where there's an anticipation that everybody 
should be on equal footing. 
Id at 10. 
Ruling, the trial court said, "I don't disagree with that." IdL. at 10. And continued: 
I think it's important issue; but the issue here has to do . . . 
with fairness, with issues of delay and . . . not simply 
economy. And I think those . . . are all good issues tha t . . . 
do have to be balanced in a way that doesn't interfere with 
the Constitutional rights and with work product. I agree with 
that. 
Id But ruled: 
But I am faced with the Spry case which certainly on its face 
says that the current Rule 16(c) does provide for the court to 
have discretion to order just such disclosures as have been 
requested here I . . . certainly didn't say that I'm 
mandated to do that in any particular case and I don't feel that 
I am. But I also think that they have shown that [] this is all 
within the scope and that the only showing that needs to be 
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made [] is materiality. And that's made once we're talking 
about the intention to call at trial. 
So, I am going to grant the State's motion with these 
conditions: I'll grant number one, and I will say the . . . cases 
that I have read, and I agree, tend to . . . balance things on the 
intent to call at trial. 
Now, this is always a difficulty, especially in criminal 
cases, to know what that means. It's a good-if you have a 
good faith intent to call that witness at trial at this point, then 
you need to disclose this information. 
If it is a[] purely rebuttal witness, that is, that you 
cannot anticipate until you actually hear the testimony, []and I 
understand that's true about every single witness and I 
recognize that argument can be made and that's why I'm 
putting a good faith provision on it; if you can anticipate 
based []on a good faith look at the case, that you will call a 
particular witness, then you need to reveal it. 
If it is . . . a true impeachment or rebuttal witness, that 
is that you would not call unless testimony goes in . . . 
alternative directions that you can't anticipate at this point, 
then you do not have to reveal that witness until that intent is 
formed. 
If during the trial, you see that you're going to call that 
witness, then you must reveal the name of that witness and 
give any information that you have about prior criminal 
history to the prosecution at that time. 
Id. at 10-12. Here, defense counsel objected, "I have no access whatsoever to any 
witness' prior criminal history. The State has all that information." Id. at 12. In 
response, the trial court said, "Okay. Then you won't have any problem with that," but 
"you'll need to give them the name as soon as you know and I will consider giving 
reasonable time for the State . . . to prepare for those witnesses. Id. The trial court then 
continued, "The same things for copies of physical evidence, documents, any exhibits 
that you intend to-to enter, same kind of qualification." Id. at 13. It skipped ruling on 
8 
expert reports and defense investigators because defense counsel was not intending to 
call either. Id Next, the trial court ruled: 
Any factual statements that you have from those witnesses, 
whether they prepare it or whether someone else prepared 
notes or statements for them, to the extent they're factual and 
are not opinions, impressions or that kind of thing, but simply 
notes or statements of those witnesses, you'll need to-to 
disclose them or provide them on the time table that we just 
talked about. 
Id at 13-14. Here, defense counsel objected, "The State never has to do that for us. We 
never get that kind of statement from their witnesses I essentially won't know what 
some of their witnesses are going to say until they put them on the stand because the only 
thing I have is a police report." IcL at 14. In response, the trial court limited the witness 
statements to "existing material." Id. at 15. 
A jury trial was conducted May 12-13, 2003. R. 231-32. At trial, the prosecutor 
objected to the admission of Cody Draper's (Draper) testimony because "He wasn't on 
our witness list," and "It's clear [defense counsel] planned on calling him because he 
showed up dressed to testify today." R. 231:22. Defense counsel responded, "I don't 
know necessarily if I am going to call Mr. Draper," but "my feeling is I'm probably not 
going to call him." Id. at 22-23. The trial court ruled: 
We are feeling our way on this discovery issue. But it's my 
view that when you found out about it, you should have faxed 
them his name definitely. I'm just letting people know that 
before, and maybe I didn't, but now we do. 
It sounds like that his testimony is going to be similar. 
You will have a chance to talk to him as some point. If for 
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some reason you need additional time to deal with his 
testimony that arises because you didn't have prior 
notification, then I will give you additional time. 
Id at 23. 
As part of his defense, McNearney called Barbara Newell (Newell), his fiance. Id 
at 168. Newell testified that "to [her] knowledge," McNearney had never owned or 
handled a gun. Id. at 169. She said on the day of the alleged crime, McNearney left in a 
car with Eric Burwell (Burwell) and "some girl." Id. at 171. Later, Burwell called and 
threatened her, her family and McNearney, saying "if I did anything to help the police 
implicate him or tell the police anything, then he would shoot us in the head." Id_ at 173-
74. On cross-examination, Newell said she "let [the prosecutor] hear the recording" 
Burwell left on her machine. Id. at 175. The following exchange then occurred: 
Q: Did you tell me anything else regarding this case? 
A: I don't know. 
Q: Isn't it true you came and told me the gun wasn't loaded? 
A: Yes, because [Burwell] had told me that it wasn't when he 
had called. 
Q: And that Joel felt bad about this case? 
A: I said that I had felt bad. 
Q: When you told me that you felt that you had been 
threatened, what did I tell you to do? 
A: Report it. 
Q: Call the police? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And I told you not to tell me but tell your defense counsel, 
correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you call the police after that? 
A: After the third threat, yes. 
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Q: And when was that? 
A: Maybe a month ago or this month-well, it was the last part 
of last month, April, or the beginning of May. 
Q: So you waited four or five months to report it? 
A: Yes, because I was afraid. 
Id. at 175-76. Later, the prosecutor asked Newell if she "called Harold Pleasant [the 
alleged victim] and asked him if you wrote a letter of apology, whether he would make 
this thing go away?" IdL at 183. Newell said, "No," and explained: 
I had told him that I was very sorry and that if anything I 
could do to help him, that I would help him. That's what 
took place and he accepted my apology. And I also told him 
that I could write him a letter of apology from myself, and he 
said there was no need for it. 
Id. The prosecutor also asked Newell about an act of attempted forgery she committed in 
1992 or 1993 and pleaded guilty to in 1998. Id. at 178-80. 
McNearney was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. R. 
186-89. On June 7, 2003, he was sentenced to six years to life for each count. R. 194. 
The sentence was suspended and McNearney was placed on supervised probation and 
ordered to serve 365 days in jail. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS l 
On November 11, 2002, Pleasant was in his living room. R. 231:49-51. A man 
wearing "camouflage pants," a mask and gloves, and carrying a gun "kicked the door in" 
and ordered him "to lay down." IcL at 50-54. The man then took Pleasant's "security 
1
 The facts are not at issue. However, this summary is provided for context. 
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box" and left. Id. at 54-57. Jerry Olson heard "the broadcast of the armed robbery" 
while he was driving in the vicinity of Pleasant's apartment. Id. at 79-80. He saw a 
"person matching the clothing description" by the road. Id. at 80-81. The person picked 
"up a box with clothing draped over it" and got in a car. Id, at 81. Olson called the 
police and followed the car. Id. at 83-86. Officers stopped the vehicle and ordered the 
occupants out. IdL at 113-14. Shaunyce Perry was the driver, Burwell was the front 
passenger, and McNearney was the back passenger. Id. at 114-15. The security box and 
a gun were found in the back seat. Id^ at 117. Later, Pleasant identified McNearney as 
having similar clothing and stature as the man who entered his home. Id. at 59. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure grants a trial court discretion to 
order prosecutorial discovery except as privileged. Utah case law has not yet addressed 
how a defendant's privileges affect prosecutorial discovery. Here, this Court should 
reverse because the trial court prejudiced McNearney ?s case by ordering general 
prosecutorial discovery in violation of McNearney's privileges. 
First, the order violated the work-product doctrine. A party may discover 
documents prepared for trial only upon a showing that it has substantial need of the 
materials and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the materials by other means. 
Even if these requirements are met, the trial court must still protect against disclosure of 
the attorney's mental impressions. Here, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering 
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discovery because the requested materials were documents prepared for trial and the 
State did not show substantial need or undue hardship. Moreover, the trial court did not 
examine the documents for mental impressions before disclosure. 
Second, the order violated due process. Discovery violates due process unless it is 
reciprocal or tilted in the defendant's favor. Here, the trial court abused its discretion by 
ordering non-reciprocal discovery. Specifically, the trial court ordered McNeamey but 
not the State, to disclose witness statements that revealed legal strategy. 
Third, the order violated the right against self-incrimination. Under the Fifth 
Amendment, discovery cannot provide a link in the chain of evidence tending to 
establish guilt. Here, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering discovery of all 
witnesses, witness statements, and evidence that McNeamey had a good faith intent to 
use at trial without considering whether these disclosures tended to incriminate 
McNeamey. Regardless, this Court should reverse because the Utah Constitution's right 
against self-incrimination does not permit general prosecutorial discovery. 
Fourth, the order violated the right to full representation of counsel. Defense 
counsel must be permitted full investigative latitude in developing a defense. This 
latitude is circumscribed if defense counsel must risk a potentially crippling revelation to 
the State of information discovered during investigation. Here, the trial court abused its 
discretion by ordering discovery of every witness statement McNeamey took from 
witnesses he had a good faith intent to call at trial. Instead, the trial court should have 
13 
examined the statements to avoid discovery of inculpatory information. 
Fifth, the trial court's order violated the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-
client privilege protects advice given by the lawyer and the client's disclosures to the 
lawyer. Here, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering discovery of the witness 
list and witness statements because these documents were direct results of McNearney's 
private disclosures and defense counsel's advice. 
Moreover, this Court should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion 
was prejudicial. This Court should presume prejudice because the discovery order 
denied McNearney full representation of counsel. Regardless, this Court should reverse 
because prejudice existed. Error warrants reversal if, absent the error, there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant. Here, the trial court's 
error was prejudicial because it required McNearney to disclose his crucial defense 
witness before trial, thereby forcing McNearney to become the conduit through which 
the State discredited his defense. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING THE STATE'S REQUEST 
FOR GENERAL DISCOVERY 
Discovery is a tool used to develop truth. See Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 
245 P.2d 224, 231 (Utah 1952) ("The objects and purposes of the discovery Rules are to 
develop the truth and prevent surprise.1'). Although mainly a civil tool, discovery is also 
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utilized in criminal law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 16. However, criminal law is only "in part 
a search for truth." Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 784 (Alaska 1974). More important, it 
is "a system designed to protect 'freedom' by insuring that no one is criminally punished 
unless the State has first succeeded in the admittedly difficult task of convincing a jury 
that the defendant is guilty." IcL (citation omitted); see State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting right against self-incrimination requires government in its 
contest with defendant to "shoulder the entire load")). 
Defendants have privileges to "redress the advantage that inheres in a government 
prosecution" and protect the attorney-client relationship. Wardius v. Oregon. 412 U.S. 
470,480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing "awesome power of indictment 
and the virtually limitless resources of government investigators"). These include the 
right against self-incrimination, the right to full representation of counsel, the right to due 
process of law, the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. See U.S. 
Const, amend. V; U.S. Const, amend. VI; U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, 
sec. 12; Utah Code Ann. §77-l-6(l)(a) (2003); Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Utah R. Evid. 
504(b); Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6. 
Even though these privileges hinder the search for truth, they must be strictly 
honored. See In re Misener. 698 P.2d 637, 643 (Cal. 1985) ("In short, while the goal of 
full presentation of all the facts is laudable, it cannot be satisfied at the expense of the 
defendant's constitutional rights"), superceded by electorate initiative. Cal. Const. Art. I, 
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sec. 30, subd. (c) (1990); People v. Knuckles. 650 N.E.2d 974, 983 (111. 1995) 
("Testimonial privileges are, by their nature, inconsistent with the search for truth," but 
"[t]he public interest in the administration of justice involves more than maximizing 
access to information." (citation omitted)); Leplev v. Lycoming County Court, 393 A.2d 
306, 309-10 (Pa. 1978) (holding public has right "'to every man's evidence,' except for 
those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege" 
(quotations and citations omitted)). Thus, where privilege and discovery collide, 
privilege must prevail. See Spry, 2001 UT App 75 at fflf23 n. 6, 25 (recognizing 
privileges are "paramount to Rule 16(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure" 
(citations omitted)); Knotts v. State. 686 So.2d 431, 474 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ("There 
is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case."). 
In Utah, prosecutorial discovery is governed by rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 says: 
Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense 
shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required 
by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of 
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(c).2 
2
 Besides the necessary privilege exception, rule 16 leaves the parameters of 
prosecutorial discovery entirely to the discretion of the trial court. Utah R. Crim. P. 
16(c). Other jurisdictions refuse to give the trial court such broad discretion. See, e.g., 
Richardson v. District Court. 632 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1981) (holding trial court improperly 
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Where no privilege is claimed, this Court has held rule 16 grants broad 
prosecutorial discovery rights. See Spry. 2001 UT App 75 at lff[6-7. In Spry, the 
defendant appealed the trial court's decision granting general prosecutorial discovery. 
Id. However, the defendant raised no privilege challenges. See Addendum E. This 
Court, while recognizing privileges are "paramount to Rule 16(c) of the Utah Rules of 
allowed State to discover witness statements because not permitted by rule); State v. 
Whitaker. 520 A.2d 1018 (Conn. 1987) (same); State v. Rhoades. 820 P.2d 665, 681 
(Idaho 1991) (holding trial court could not order defendant to prepare expert reports for 
discovery because rule did not allow); State v. Sandstrom, 595 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1979) 
(holding trial court improperly allowed State to discover witness statements because rule 
did not allow); State v. Hereford. 537 N.W.2d 62, 70-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
trial court erred by allowing discovery of witness statements because rule says State can 
only discover after witness examined). Instead, these jurisdictions enact rules that 
delineate exactly what can be discovered by the prosecution. See Addendum C. 
Acknowledging this trend, the Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure has considered amending rule 16 to define the parameters of 
prosecutorial discovery. See Addendum D. Because prosecutorial discovery presents so 
many constitutional pitfalls, this Court should decline to permit prosecutorial discovery 
until the rules committee or legislature amends rule 16 to provide specific guidance on 
prosecutorial discovery. See Moore v. State. 467 P.2d 904, 907 (Ariz. 1970) (leaving 
prosecutorial discovery to "rule-making procedure of this Court rather than the case-by-
case basis" because it "is fraught with constitutional problems"); Whitaker. 520 A.2d at 
1019 ("A number of courts facing prosecutorial discovery issues like the one at bar have 
declined to adopt a rule of mutual disclosure of witness statements in the absence of 
some previous authorization by statute or rule of practice" because, "'[h]owever 
appealing the notion of full disclosure may be in the abstract, important constitutional 
and societal interests affected by the criminal discovery process counsel against casual 
acceptance of such a major revision of the established statutory schemes.'" (citations 
omitted)); King v. Venters, 596 S.W.2d 721, 721 (Ky. 1980) (holding State could not 
discover witness list because not provided for in rule and "not entirely convinced that it 
would be free of constitutional difficulty"); Taylor v. Liebson. 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 
544 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (holding State could not discover witness list because "there is 
no authority in this Commonwealth for requiring a defendant to furnish such a list"). 
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Criminal Procedure," held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the 
requested discovery and declined to consider whether the discovery violated the 
defendant's privileges. Spry, 2001 UT App 75 at ffl[23 n. 6, 25 (citations omitted). Thus, 
because privileges override rule 16(c), as interpreted by Spry, a trial court cannot blindly 
apply Spry if a privilege challenge is made. IcL at ^23 n. 6. Instead, the trial court must 
analyze the discovery request in light of the privilege asserted. IcL 
In this case, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion 
by blindly applying Spry in spite of McNearney's privilege challenges. R. 214:10-15. 
Specifically, the trial court abused its discretion by granting the prosecutor's discovery 
request even though the request violated: (A) the work-product doctrine, (B) the right to 
due process of law, (C) the right against self-incrimination, (D) the right to full 
representation of counsel, and (E) the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, this Court 
should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial. 
A. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated the Work-Product Doctrine. 
Utah's work-product doctrine says: 
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible 
things . . . prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by 
or for another party or by or for that other party's 
representative . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking 
discovery has substantial need of the materials . . . and that 
the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In 
ordering discovery of such materials when the required 
showing has been made, the court shall protect against 
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
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or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a 
party concerning the litigation. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
"Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the 
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients." 
United States v.Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237 (1975). "In performing his various duties, 
however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from 
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Id. "Proper preparation of 
a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the 
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without 
undue and needless interference." Id. If work product was "open to opposing counsel on 
mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten"; an 
attorneys' "thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own"; and "[inefficiency, 
unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop." Id_ In sum, "[t]he effect on 
the legal profession would be demoralizing," and "the interests of the clients and the 
cause of justice would be poorly served." IdL; see Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, v. 
Uno, 932 P.2d 589, 590 (Utah 1997) (holding work-product doctrine preserves adversary 
system "by providing attorneys with a zone of privacy permitting effective client 
advocacy"); Gold Standard v. American Barrick Resources Corp.. 805 P.2d 164, 167 
(Utah 1990) ("The underlying theme of [work-product doctrine] is the preservation of the 
adversarial system by the protection of the privacy of an attorney's files prepared in 
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anticipation of litigation from encroachments of opposing counsel." (citation omitted)). 
Although couched in the rules of civil procedure, the work-product doctrine also 
applies to criminal cases. See Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e) (noting rules of civil procedure 
"shall also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement"); Uno, 932 P.2d at 590 (applying work-product 
doctrine to criminal case). In fact, the work-product doctrine's "role in assuring the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital" because the 
"interests of society and the accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the 
question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough 
preparation and presentation of each side of the case." Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238; Uno, 
932 P.2d at 590-91 (holding files/documents not discoverable in postconviction 
proceeding because attorney-criminal client relationship is "extremely sensitive, " the 
"level of reliance, trust, and open communication in such a relationship must necessarily 
be very high," and a "discovery policy that creates a significant likelihood that such files 
will be opened in subsequent proceedings to the State, and thus to the prosecution, would 
dramatically impair the trial preparation process"). 
"At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the 
attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's 
case." Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238. "This work is reflected . . . in interviews, statements, 
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memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless 
other tangible and intangible ways." Id. at 237. In Utah, "[t]here are three essential 
requirements for materials to be protected by the work product doctrine under rule 
26(b)(3): (1) the material must consist of documents or tangible things, (2) prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial, (3) by or for another party or by or for that party's 
representative." Gold Standard v. American Barrick Resources Corp.. 801 P.2d 909, 910 
(Utah 1990). If these requirements are met, the privilege applies unless "the party 
seeking discovery can show a need for the information and that it cannot be obtained 
without substantial hardship." Gold Standard, 805 P.2d at 168 (citations omitted). 
Further, "if the documents convey the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal 
theories of an attorney or party, the documents will be afforded heightened protection as 
'opinion work product.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
Here, the trial court erred by ruling the State could discover the documents 
requested because they were work product and the State made no showing of substantial 
hardship. Specifically, the requested witness list and investigative reports of witness 
statements were documents prepared in anticipation of trial by defense counsel or her 
agents. R. 133-34.3 Further, there was no waiver because McNearney did not call his 
3
 See State v. Williams, 404 A.2d 34, 38 (N.J. 1979) ("Evidential materials 
obtained in the exercise of this professional responsibility are so interwoven with the 
professional judgments relating to a client's case, strategy and tactics that they may be 
said to share the characteristics of an attorney's 'work product.'"); Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 399, 401 (1981) (holding that "forcing an attorney to disclose notes 
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investigators to the stand. See Nobles. 422 U.S. at 239 n. 14 (holding work-product 
protection waived where counsel makes "testimonial useM of materials). 
Thus, to discover the witness list and any investigator reports that recorded 
and memoranda of witnesses' oral statements is particularly disfavored because it tends 
to reveal the attorney's mental processes," and Mnotes of conversation with witness 'are 
so much a product of the lawyer's thinking and so little probative of the witness's actual 
words that they are absolutely protected from disclosure'1); Goldberg v. United States, 
425 U.S. 94, 103, 106 (1976) (holding law allowing discovery of witness statements 
recorded by Government lawyer only if statement is "signed or otherwise adopted or 
approved by" witness, satisfies "primary policy underlying the work-product 
doctrine-i.e., protection of the privacy of an attorney's mental processes," because it 
"will not compel disclosure of a Government lawyer's recordation of mental impressions, 
personal beliefs, trial strategy, legal conclusion, or anything else that 'could not fairly be 
said to be the witness' own' statement" and "if a witness has for some reason 'adopted or 
approved' a writing containing trial strategy or similar matter, such matter would be 
excised under [law] as not relating to the subject matter of the witness' testimony"); 
Jackson v. State, 623 So.2d 411, 413 (Ala. Ct. App. 1993) (holding rule that "does not 
authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense 
documents made by the defendant" prevents State from discovering "names of witnesses 
[defendant] intends to call"); State v. Bowen. 449 P.2d 603, 607 (Ariz. 1969) (holding 
defendant could not discover prosecutor witness notes because work product and 
defendant did not show unusual circumstances to further justice); People v. Small. 631 
P.2d 148, 159 (Colo. 1981) (holding defendant waived work-product protection of 
witness statements by presenting statements as substantive evidence); Peel v. State, 154 
So.2d 910, 914 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963) (holding subpoena duce tecum "in no sense reaches 
notes or evidence taken by the prosecuting officer at his expense and by his private 
stenographer. These are the private property of the solicitor"); George v. State. 397 
N.E.2d 1027, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (holding "witness statements taken by the 
defendant, his attorney, or his agents in anticipation of litigation are not subject to pre-
trial discovery by the prosecution over a timely work-product objection"); People v. 
Holtzman. 593 N.W.2d 617, 622-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding witness statements 
not discoverable because work product); State v. Hoop. 731 N.E.2d 1177, 1187-88 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1999) (holding witness statements are work product and only discoverable by "a 
showing of substantial need, that the information is important in the preparation of the 
party's case, and that there is an inability or difficulty in obtaining the information 
without undue hardship"). 
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witness statements without revealing defense counsel's mental processes or legal 
strategies, the State was required to show "substantial need of the materials . . . and that 
the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
materials by other means." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Alternatively, to discover any 
investigator reports, including witness statements, that revealed defense counsel's mental 
processes, conclusions, opinions or legal theories, the State was required to overcome the 
"heightened protection" of opinion work product. Gold Standard . 805 P.2d at 168; see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) ("In ordering discovery of [work-product] when the required 
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation."); Hoop, 731 N.E.2d at 1188 (holding 
witness statements reflecting "attorney's mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, 
judgments, or legal theories," are "opinion work product" and "receive[] near absolute 
protection"). However, the State made no attempt to show substantial need or undue 
hardship. R. 133-36; 214. Moreover, even if it had tried, its superior investigatory 
power would have made such a showing difficult. See_ Wardius. 412 U.S. at 475 n. 9 
(explaining state's superior investigating skills and numerous tactical advantages). 
Besides, before ordering McNearney to disclose any document, the trial court was 
obligated to analyze the documents to decide which were privileged. See Gold Standard. 
801 P.2d at 911 n. 3 ("Any document for which protection from discovery is claimed 
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must be independently analyzed to determine if the privilege actually applies.").4 
However, the trial court did not view any documents before granting the discovery 
request and made no such analysis of their individual privilege. R. 214:10-15. 
B. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated Due Process, 
The United States Constitution guarantees no person shall be deprived "of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV. In Wardius, 
the State discovered defense alibi witnesses but refused to disclose its own rebuttal 
witnesses. Wardius. 412 U.S. at 473. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed because, 
even though the due process clause "has little to say regarding the amount of discovery 
which the parties must be afforded," "it does speak to the balance offerees between the 
accused and his accuser." IcL (citations omitted). Specifically, the "State may not insist 
4
 See Nobles 422 U.S. at 240 (noting trial court properly exercised discretion by 
not authorizing a "general 'fishing expedition,'" but giving a ruling "quite limited in 
scope, opening to prosecution scrutiny only the portion of the report that related to the 
testimony the investigator would offer to discredit the witnesses' identification 
testimony"); Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 119-20 (D.C. 1979) (holding 
trial court should not make "sweeping directive" that defendant surrender information, 
but should conduct in camera inspection and allow "government to receive only those 
portions, if any, relevant to the matters raised by the actual testimony of the affected 
witnesses"); Sandstrom, 595 P.2d at 332 (holding trial court erred by issuing "a blanket 
order directing defense counsel to produce statements of any witness that was going to 
testify for the defense in the case"); Hoop, 731 N.E.2d at 1185 (holding that when 
"inquiring into issues of privilege, it is best that the trial court hold an in camera hearing 
to review the allegedly privileged material" because, "[b]y doing so, the trial court may 
determine whether the information sought is privileged without the information being 
disclosed to other parties or terminating the privilege," "make an informed decision as to 
the evidentiary nature of the material," and "discern that aspect of the evidence, which 
has evidentiary value from that which does not" (quotations and citation omitted)). 
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that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while 
maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses" because it flis fundamentally 
unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time 
subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of 
evidence which he disclosed to the State." Id. at 475-76. 
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address prosecutorial discovery, it 
stated, "Indeed, the State's inherent information-gathering advantages suggest that if 
there is to be any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in the defendant's favor." 
Id. at 475 n. 9. Concurring, Justice Douglas clarified: 
The Bill of Rights does not envision an adversary proceeding 
between two equal parties.... But, the Constitution 
recognized the awesome power of indictment and the 
virtually limitless resources of government investigators. 
Much of the Bill of Rights is designed to redress the 
advantage that inheres in a government prosecution. It is not 
for the Court to change that balance. 
Id. at 480 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
When addressing prosecutorial discovery, other jurisdictions have interpreted 
Wardius to mean, at the very least, that a rule must entitle a State "to only those discovery 
rights specifically granted to the defendant." Rower v. State. 443 S.E.2d 839, 842 (Ga. 
1994).5 Although Utah case law has not addressed reciprocity, it agrees that "when the 
5
 See Middleton. 401 A.2d at 120 (reversing because "actual effect of the disputed 
rulings was to grant" government more discovery than defense); State v. Sherman. 770 
P.2d 789, 793 (Haw. 1989) (noting purpose of alibi rule "was to provide reciprocal 
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field is not level it is because it is purposely sloped in the defendant's favor/' Mickelson, 
848 P.2d at 688 n. 15 (citations omitted); Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.8 (imposing upon 
prosecutor, but not defense, "special responsibilities" concerning disclosure of evidence). 
Here, the trial court violated due process by granting the State blanket discovery 
rights without imposing reciprocity limitations. Specifically, the trial court ordered 
McNeamey to disclose a witness list; copies of "physical evidence, documents, and 
photographs"; and copies of witness statements. R. 133; 214:10-15. However, when 
making this order, the trial court did not consider whether the State was required to 
disclose comparable information. Id, Accordingly, the trial court's order violated due 
process because it ordered McNeamey to provide discovery without first ensuring that, at 
the very least, McNeamey had requested and received similar discovery. Id. In fact, the 
record shows the discovery order was not reciprocal because defense counsel did not 
request or receive witness statements created by the prosecution. R. 18-19; 86-87; 
214:14-15. Rather, defense counsel only received the witness statements included in the 
police reports, which were not the product of the prosecutor's legal representation and 
did not reveal the prosecutor's investigatory strategy. Id. 
discovery between" prosecution and defense); State v. Clark. 493 S.E.2d 770 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1997) (reversing because defendant did not request similar discovery before being 
required to disclose); State v. Kuhrts. 571 S.W.2d 709, 713-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) 
(distinguishing rule from Wardius because requires reciprocal discovery); State v. 
Nelson. 545 P.2d 36, 39-40 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (same). 
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C The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated McNearnev's Right Against 
Self-incrimination. 
The right against self-incrimination is protected by the United States and the Utah 
Constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12; Utah Code Ann. § 
77-l-6(2)(c) (2003). The Utah Constitution, like the federal constitution, is limited in 
"scope to those situations where the state seeks evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature." American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 
1985). However, Utah courts have not yet decided whether the Utah Constitution 
follows the federal constitution in regard to prosecutorial discovery. Id. In this case, this 
Court should reverse because: (1) the trial court's order granting the general 
prosecutorial discovery violated the Fifth Amendment, and (2) the Utah Constitution 
prohibits general prosecutorial discovery. 
1. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated the Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const, amend. V. The United States 
Supreme Court has not yet determined whether general prosecutorial discovery violates 
the Fifth Amendment.6 Rather, the Supreme Court has only considered the limited 
6
 In Nobles, the Supreme Court held a trial court could require a defendant to 
disclose witness statements where there was "no suggestion that the portions subject to 
the disclosure order reflected any information that [defendant] conveyed to the 
investigator" because the "Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination [is] personal to the defendant.'" Nobles. 422 U.S. at 233-34. Here, the trial 
court refused to consider whether the discovery order required disclosure of information 
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prosecutorial discovery of an alibi defense. See Williams. 399 U.S. 78. In Williams, the 
defendant challenged a rule requiring him to "give notice of an alibi defense and disclose 
his alibi witnesses," which allowed the State to take a witness's "deposition in advance of 
trial and to find rebuttal testimony." IcL at 82-83. The Supreme Court affirmed because: 
[The] notice-of-alibi rule by itself in no way affected 
[defendant's] crucial decision to call alibi witnesses or added 
to the legitimate pressures leading to that course of action. At 
most, the rule only compelled [defendant] to accelerate the 
timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier 
date information that the [defendant] from the beginning 
planned to divulge at trial. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment 
privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional 
conveyed by McNearney to defense counsel, ruling instead the information was 
discoverable simply because it was material under Spry. R. 214:10-12. Regardless, the 
record shows the information included in the discovery order reflected personal 
information McNearney conveyed to defense counsel. IcL at 3-5., Specifically, the order 
required pretrial disclosure of all evidence and all witnesses McNearney intended to 
produce at trial and any existing interview notes of those witnesses' statements. Id. at 
10-12. Defense counsel gathered and organized this information at McNearney's request 
and with McNearney's assistance. IcL at 3-4. Had McNearney remained silent, defense 
counsel would not have had the information to disclose. IcL; see Misener, 698 P.2d at 
647 ("A defense attorney often finds witnesses through the defendant, and interviews 
those witnesses using information given to him by the defendant. Thus, even if the 
privilege against self-incrimination were to be limited to the defendant's own statements, 
it could be violated by a discovery order demanding witness statements made to the 
defense attorney or his agent."). Thus, the Fifth Amendment is implicated because the 
trial court ordered sweeping pretrial disclosure of McNearney's personal information. 
See Middleton, 401 A.2d at 120 (distinguishing discovery order from Nobles because 
sweeping order for pretrial discovery of witness statements rather than carefully limited 
order and defendant did not make testimonial use of statements); Sandstrom, 595 P.2d at 
332 (distinguishing discovery order from Nobles because "blanket order directing" 
pretrial disclosure of "statements of any witness that was going to testify for the defense 
in the case"); State v. Malzac. 244 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Minn. 1976) (holding Nobles not 
distinguishable because "nothing in the expert's report originated with the defendant"). 
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right to await the end of the State's case before announcing 
the nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to 
await the jury's verdict on the State's case-in-chief before 
deciding whether or not to take the stand himself. 
Id. at 85. In other words, the alibi discovery did not violate the Fifth Amendment 
because it presented no danger of incriminating the defendant. IdL_ at 82-83. Instead, it 
simply promoted efficiency by allowing the State to prepare rebuttal before trial rather 
than obtaining a continuance during trial "to do precisely what it did here prior to trial: 
take the deposition of the witness and find rebuttal evidence." IdL at 82-83, 86. 
Although the Williams decision deals solely with a notice-of-alibi rule, its 
reasoning is not expressly limited to notice-of-alibi rules. IcL Accordingly, many 
jurisdictions have applied its timing rationale to other categories of prosecutorial 
discovery. See, e.g.. People v. District Court, 531 P.2d 626 (Colo. 1975) (upholding 
discovery rule even though broader than Williams because timing rationale applies). 
Most of these jurisdictions have applied Williams' timing rationale blindly, ignoring the 
underlying self-incrimination analysis and simply assuming all evidence the defendant 
intends to present at trial is not incriminatory. See, e.g.. People, 531 P.2d at 631 (holding 
Williams timing rationale applies to discovery of defenses and witness names because 
rule permits discovery "only when the defendant intends to introduce them at trial"); 
State v. Lvnch, 559 A.2d 302 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding Williams timing rationale 
applies to discovery of expert report because order limited to experts defendant intends to 
call). The Supreme Court has not yet decided the constitutionality of these cases. 
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Conversely, at least one jurisdiction has declined to blindly apply Williams' 
timing rationale, choosing instead to analyze the defendant's evidence for incriminatory 
information before permitting pretrial discovery. In People, the Colorado Supreme Court 
considered an order allowing prosecutorial "discovery of all. defenses which the 
defendant intends to use at trial." People., 531 P.2d at 631. Although Williams' timing 
theory was met because "the rule permits discovery of defense theories and the names of 
supporting witnesses only when the defendant intends to introduce them at trial," the 
court remanded because "the request for disclosure may be overbroad and, therefore, 
invalid if it seeks information which might serve as an unconstitutional link in a chain of 
evidence tending to establish the accused's guilt of a criminal offense." Id. at 632. In 
other words, although the timing rationale was dispositive in Williams because the alibi 
discovery did not incriminate and was only used for rebuttal, the timing rationale was not 
dispositive in general discovery cases because other defenses may tend to incriminate the 
defendant and discovery of such defenses could be used in the State's case-in-chief. Id_ 
In Richardson, the Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in regard to 
discovery of witness statements. Richardson, 632 P.2d at 598 n. 2. Regardless of the 
timing rationale, "pretrial disclosure of defense witnesses' statements implicates the 
privilege against self-incrimination" because "the disclosure might furnish the 
prosecution with information useful to the state's case in chief or with impeachment or 
rebuttal evidence damaging to the defendant" and "might connect the defendant with 
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other offenses and lead to . . . another prosecution.11 IdL. 598 n. 2 (citation omitted). 
Here, the trial court's general prosecutorial discovery order violated the Fifth 
Amendment because it provided a link in the chain of evidence tending to establish 
McNearney's guilt. The trial court granted the discovery request because it met Spry's 
broad "materiality" test and ordered McNearney to disclose all witnesses, witness 
statements, and evidence he had a "good faith intent" to use at trial.7 R. 214:10-12. 
However, a discovery order does not satisfy the Fifth Amendment simply because it is 
limited to evidence the defendant intends to present at trial.8 "It requires no great effort 
or imagination to conceive of a variety of situations wherein the disclosure of the 
expected testimony of defense witnesses, or even their names and addresses, could easily 
provide an essential link in a chain of evidence underlying the prosecution's case in 
7
 The trial court's "good faith intent" standard proved difficult to follow. At trial, 
the State objected to the admission of Draper's testimony because he was not disclosed 
and, "It's clear [defense counsel] planned on calling him because he showed up dressed 
to testify." R. 231:22. Although the trial court chastised defense counsel for her failure 
to disclose Draper, it did not exclude Draper's testimony. IdL at 23. Instead, the trial 
court adopted a much easier standard to follow by saying it would give the State 
additional time to prepare at the time of Draper's testimony if necessary. Id. 
8
 The trial court actually ordered McNearney to reveal all witnesses and witness 
statements except those "you would not call unless testimony goes in . . . alternative 
directions that you can't anticipate at this point." R. 214:12-13. In other words, 
McNearney was not just required to reveal those witnesses he intended to call, but all 
witnesses except those reserved to rebut a very unusual case-in-chief. IcL Thus, even 
under the broad Williams interpretation adopted by most jurisdictions, the trial court's 
order violated the Fifth Amendment because it included witnesses McNearney did not 
intend to call. See Knuckles, 650 N.E.2d at 976 (holding discovery order violated Fifth 
Amendment because applied regardless of intent to call). 
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chief" Prudhomme v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 466 P.2d 673, 674 fCal. 
1970), superceded by electorate initiative, Cal. Const. Art. I, sec. 30, subd. (c) (1990).9 
For example, if a defendant in a murder case intended to call 
witness A to testify that defendant killed in self-defense, 
pretrial disclosure of that information could provide the 
prosecution with its sole eyewitness to defendant's homicide. 
Similarly, consider the effect of disclosing the name or 
expected testimony of witness B, whom defendant intends to 
call only as a 'last resort' to testify that defendant only 
committed a lesser-included offense. 
Id. at 677. Instead of assuming the requested evidence was not incriminatory simply 
because McNearney intended to present it at trial, the trial court should have considered 
the underlying incriminatory possibilities and limited its discovery order to prevent 
discovery of information the State could subsequently use in its case-in-chief. See 
Williams. 399 U.S. at 82-83, 85 (noting notice-of-alibi rule did not violate Fifth 
Amendment because alibi evidence was only used for rebuttal and pretrial discovery 
merely "accelerate[d] the timing of [defendant's] disclosure").10 
9
 Although Prudhomme was decided on state constitutional grounds, see. Misener. 
698 P.2d at 647, its reasoning is instructive because it considered prosecutorial discovery 
broader than alibi discovery. 
10
 See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 240 (approving trial court's order because it was "quite 
limited in scope" and did not authorize "a general 'fishing expedition' into the defense 
files or indeed even into the defense investigator's report"); Middleton, 401 A.2d at 118 
n. 15, 120 (holding discovery suffered from "overbreadth" because trial court issued 
"sweeping directive" and "made no attempt to confine discovery process to material 
relevant to the in-court testimony of the declarant witnesses and the impeachment 
thereof1); Williams, 404 A.2d at 38 ("It is abhorrent to our concept of criminal justice to 
compel a defendant, under the guise of reciprocal discovery, to disclose to the State 
inculpatory evidence uncovered by defense counsel during his preparation for trial and 
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2. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated the Utah Constitution. 
Utah's constitution guarantees, "The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself." Utah Const. Art. I, sec. 12. Utah courts have not yet decided 
whether the Utah Constitution permits general prosecutorial discovery. See Spry, 2001 
UT App 75 at ^ [23 n. 6 (noting without comment "that a defendant's protection against 
self-incrimination prevents extensive prosecution discovery" (citations omitted)). "It is a 
cardinal rule of construction that constitutions should be construed in light of their 
framers' intent." Crosgrove, 701 P.2d at 1072. However, "the scope of constitutional 
guarantees is not limited by their historical roots." IdL at 1073. Thus, "[i]n determining 
the proper scope of the privilege, [this Court] must also deal with underlying policy 
considerations." Id This Court should interpret Utah's Constitution to prohibit general 
prosecutorial discovery because this interpretation is supported by the framers' intent and 
by the underlying policy considerations. 
a^  The Framers' Intent Forbids Broad Prosecutorial Discovery. In drafting Utah's 
privilege against self-incrimination, the framers "intended the privilege to have the same 
scope that it had under similar constitutional provisions which was the scope it had at 
common law." Cros grove. 701 P.2d at 1073. The common law strictly prohibited 
prosecutorial discovery. See Scott, 519 P.2d at 778 ("The common law recognized no 
then allow the State to use that evidence as part of its case in chief"). 
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right of discovery in a criminal case by either the prosecution or the defendant").11 It 
recognized the awesome power of the prosecutor as opposed to the weakness and 
vulnerability of the prosecuted: 
Besides greater financial and staff resources with which to 
investigate and scientifically analyze evidence, the prosecutor 
has a number of tactical advantages. First, he begins his 
investigation shortly after the crime has been committed 
when physical evidence is more likely to be found and when 
witnesses are more apt to remember events. Only after the 
prosecutor has gathered sufficient evidence is the defendant 
informed of the charges against him; by the time the 
defendant or his attorney begins any investigation into the 
facts of the case, the trail in not only cold, but a diligent 
prosecutor will have removed much of the evidence from the 
field. In addition to the advantage of timing, the prosecutor 
may compel people, including the defendant, to cooperate. 
The defendant may be questioned within limits, and if 
arrested his person may be searched. He may also be 
compelled to participate in various nontestimonial 
identification procedures. The prosecutor may force third 
persons to cooperate through the use of grand juries and may 
issue subpoenas requiring appearance before prosecutorial 
investigatory boards. With probable cause the police may 
search private areas and seize evidence and may tap 
telephone conversations. They may use undercover agents 
and have access to vast amounts of information in 
government files. Finally, respect for government authority 
will cause many people to cooperate with the police or 
prosecutor voluntarily when they might not cooperate with 
11
 The common law also initially prohibited defense discovery. See Scott. 519 
P.2d at 778. However, this prohibition disappeared quickly because courts recognized 
defense discovery, like constitutional privileges, protected the defendant from the 
awesome powers of the State. See, e.g.. United States v. Burr. 25 F. Cas. 30 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
1807) (No. 14, 692d) (holding if letter had evidentiary relevance or was useful in cross-
examination it could not, in fairness to the defendant, be "withheld from him"). 
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the defendant. 
Wardius, 412 U.S. at 475 n. 9 (citation omitted); see Scott, 519 P.2d at 784 (same); 
Misener. 698 P.2d at 642-43, 643 n.3 (same); Richardson. 632 P.2d at 599 (same). 
The common law rectified this imbalance by granting defendants privileges, 
including the right against self-incrimination. See. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 480 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) ("But, the Constitution recognized the awesome power of indictment and the 
virtually limitless resources of government investigators. Much of the Bill of Rights is 
designed to redress the advantage that inheres in a government prosecution.").12 Whether 
the right against self-incrimination hindered the search for truth was immaterial because 
it existed to ensure that the "'government seeking to punish an individual produce the 
evidence against him by its own independent labors.'" Crosgrove. 701 P.2d at 1073 
(citation omitted).13 Thus, because the common law prohibited prosecutorial discovery, 
12
 See Misener, 698 P.2d at 642-43 ("The Framers were well aware of the 
awesome investigative and prosecutorial powers of government and it was in order to 
limit those powers that they spelled out in detail in the Constitution the procedure to be 
followed in criminal trials.'" (citation omitted)); Middleton. 401 A.2d at 116 n. 11 
(noting "proper deference to the constitutional principles which burden the state alone 
with proof of criminal charges, and considerations of fairness in light of the normal 
superiority of the government's investigatory resources, necessarily will frustrate the 
evolution of a parity of access similar to that embodied in the rules applicable to civil 
proceedings." (citations omitted)); Knuckles, 650 N.E.2d at 976 (noting prosecutorial 
discovery highlights "tension between two competing policies: one that favors the broad 
discovery of relevant information and another that guards the narrow discovery 
exemptions, based on privilege, which are deeply rooted in the common law and the 
Federal and State Constitutions"). 
13
 See Allen v. Illinois. 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) ("The privilege against self-
incrimination . . . is not designed to enhance the reliability of the factfinding 
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this Court should interpret the Utah Constitution to prohibit prosecutorial discovery. 
L Policy Considerations Require this Court to Prohibit General Prosecutorial 
Discovery. The inequities inherent in criminal prosecution are as dangerous today as 
they were at common law. The government is still a formidable power, possessing the 
skills and resources necessary to investigate and prosecute, and the defendant is still an 
unwitting opponent, severely hampered by limited resources and tactical disadvantages. 
See supra Part C.2.a. Accordingly, the privileges granted to the defendant to level the 
playing field must be protected as carefully today as they were at common law. See 
Williams, 399 U.S. at 113-14 (Black, J., dissenting) ("A criminal trial is in part a search 
for truth. But it is also a system designed to protect 'freedom' by insuring that no one is 
criminally punished unless the State has first succeeded in the admittedly difficult task of 
convincing a jury that the defendant is guilty.").14 
Moreover, the timing rationale of Williams, as applied to general prosecutorial 
discovery, "is plainly and simply wrong as a matter of fact and law." Williams. 399 U.S. 
determination; it stands in the Constitution for entirely independent reasons"; thus, it is 
"no argument against a claim of the privilege to say that granting the claim would 
decrease the reliability of the factfinding process."). 
14
 See Scott, 519 P.2d at 784 (holding discovery ^s not a 'two-way street.5"); 
Prudhomme, 466 P.2d at 678 (Peters, J., concurring) ("Discovery is not a 'two-way 
street' because of the constitutional rights of defendants not accorded the prosecution."); 
Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County. 372 P.2d 919, 924 (Cal. 1962) (Peters, J., 
dissenting) ("The simple fact is that our system of criminal procedure is founded upon 
the principle that the ascertainment of the facts is. a 'one-way street.' It is the 
constitutional right of the defendant, who is presumed to be innocent, to stand silent 
while the state attempts to meet its burden of proof."). 
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at 108 (Black, J., dissenting). These jurisdictions assume pretrial discovery does not 
violate the right against self-incrimination because "compelling a defendant to give 
[evidence] before a trial is no different from requiring a defendant, after the State has 
produced the evidence against him at trial, to [present a defense] before the jury retires to 
consider the case.M Id. However, "a defendant's midtrial strategy choices are not 
identical to his pretrial decisions; nor are the problems and opportunities contemplated by 
an accused in formulating a course of action to be followed during the presentation of his 
defense at trial identical to the same considerations before trial." Scott, 519 P.2d at 783-
84; see Williams, 399 U.S. at 110 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting "pretrial decision cannot 
be analyzed as simply a matter of 'timing/ influenced by the same factors operating at 
the trial itself). There may be "some similarity between the defendant's pretrial and at-
trial choices." Scott, 519 P.2d at 784 (citation omitted). However: 
because of the prosecutor's heavy burden of proof, the 
defendant is best advised not to open up any source of 
potentially adverse information unless he feels that the state 
has in all likelihood proved its case; and it is only after the 
prosecutor has presented his evidence in court that the 
defendant can adequately make this judgement. By contrast, 
there is no way the defendant can know before trial the actual 
strength of the evidence against him as it will appear to the 
trier of fact, even if he has himself benefitted from extensive 
discovery; witnesses' testimony under oath and cross-
examination may radically depart from their versions of the 
events as given to the police or defense counsel prior to trial. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
Thus, this Court should interpret the Utah Constitution to prohibit general 
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prosecutorial discovery. See Misener. 698 P.2d at 643 ("'Any effort to further the truth-
seeking function bears considerable risk of encroaching on constitutional and other 
protections: as we have noted, the problem is complicated by an interrelated composite of 
state and federal constitutional concerns, statutory rules and common law privileges.'" 
(citation omitted)). Such an interpretation will not weaken the State's ability to 
prosecute. See Id. at 642-43 (holding argument that prosecutorial discovery is needed to 
avoid giving defendant "unfair element of surprise" fails because "actual advantage to the 
defendant is inherent in the type of trial required by our Bill of Rights"). The situations 
where the prosecution arguably suffers a tactical disadvantage justifying discovery have 
already been rectified by statute or rule. See Utah R. Crim. P. 16(c) (explaining "defense 
shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (2003) (requiring defendant to reveal alibi 
information "not less than ten days before trial"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (2003) 
(requiring parties to give notice of mental state expert "not less than 30 days before 
trial"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (2003) (requiring defendant to reveal insanity defense 
"not fewer than 30 days before the trial"). Rather, prohibiting general prosecutorial 
discovery merely sacrifices possible efficiency for constitutional soundness. See. Spry, 
2001 UT App 75 at lffl23 n. 6 (recognizing constitutional privileges are "paramount to" to 
discovery); Scott, 519 P.2d at 787 ("We recognize that in some cases this may result in 
delays and inconvenience at trial, but we are not prepared to exchange a fundamental 
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constitutional right for expediency). If, during trial, the trial court determines other 
evidence presented by the defense constituted undue surprise on the State, the trial court 
can cure the injury simply by granting the State a continuance. See Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 
at 1073 ('The primary basis of the privilege is the respect of government for its citizens. 
T o respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal 
justice demands that government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence 
against him by its own independent labors.5" (citation omitted)).15 Here, the trial court 
acknowledged that a continuance would cure any possible surprise problems. R. 214:12 
(saying it would "consider giving reasonable time for the State . . . to prepare for those 
witnesses). Moreover, it agreed to utilize this approach when the State complained that 
defense counsel did not disclose Draper as a witness. R. 231 :22-23. Thus, this Court 
should reverse because the Utah Constitution prohibits general prosecutorial discovery. 
D. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated McNearney's Right to Full 
Representation of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment says, MIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
15
 See Scott, 519 P.2d at 787 ("We do not believe our decision in the instant case 
will leave [the State] in a disadvantaged posture during future prosecutions. Certainly in 
the past, the State has experienced no substantial inability to conduct prosecutions 
without the benefit of extensive prosecutorial discovery. We anticipate that it will 
continue to perform as effectively in the future. In the event that the State should be 
unfairly surprised or prejudiced at trial by unexpected defense witnesses, statements or 
theories, we assume that the trial courts will exercise sound discretion . . . and grant the 
State a continuance or other appropriate remedy."). 
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The right to counsel is "a sacred right" that "may not be infringed or frittered away," or 
"denied by a court." State v. Aikers. 51 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah 1935); see State v. 
McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (same). Inherent in the right to 
counsel is the right to full representation. See. State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56,^[23, 4 P.3d 
795 (noting right to counsel "includes effective assistance"); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas. 
906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995) (noting "'it has long been recognized that the right to 
counsel is the right to effective assistance'" (citation omitted)). The purpose of requiring 
full representation "is to better ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial." State v. 
Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1257 (Utah 1993). This includes both assisting the defendant in 
preparing his defense and not forcing the defendant to incriminate himself. See Utah R. 
Prof. Conduct 1.3 Comment ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to 
the interest of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); State v. 
Melvins. 382 A.2d 925, 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (holding right to full 
representation "means providing the defendant with those necessary tools, such as 
investigative support and expert analysis that he needs to carry on his defense"). 
To safeguard defense counsel's ability to provide full representation, "it is 
essential that he be permitted full investigative latitude in developing a meritorious 
defense on his client's behalf." State v. Mingo. 392 A.2d 590 (NJ. 1978). "This latitude 
will be circumscribed if defense counsel must risk a potentially crippling revelation to the 
State of information discovered in the course of investigation which he chooses not to 
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use at trial." IcL at 592. Thus, counsel "must have the opportunity to test confidentially 
various defense strategies, free from the apprehension of having to furnish the State with 
incriminating information." Melvins, 382 A.2d at 929. In other words, if, during 
investigation, defense counsel discovers information he determines not to use at trial, this 
information should be protected from discovery. See. Williams. 404 A.2d at 37 ("Once 
counsel has determined not to use such statements of a State's witness at trial, the 
material is entitled to the protection."). "To hold otherwise would infringe on a 
defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because of the 
chilling effect it would have on defense investigation." Id. 
Specifically, when determining what information is protected by the Sixth 
Amendment, the trial court cannot assume a witness statement is wholly discoverable 
simply because the defendant intends to call the witness at trial. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 
240 (noting order was "quite limited in scope, opening to prosecution scrutiny only the 
portion of the report that related to the testimony of the investigator would offer to 
discredit the witnesses' identification testimony"). Rather, the trial court should inquire 
whether incriminatory information is contained within the statement and should extend 
protection to that information. See Williams. 404 A.2d at 37 ("Once counsel has 
determined not to use such statements of a State's witness at trial, the material is entitled 
to the protection."). Otherwise, "[djefense counsel would be hesitant to make an in-
depth investigation of the case for fear that inculpatory material would be disclosed 
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which might have to be turned over to the State." IdL 
Here, the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment because it ordered blanket 
discovery of every witness statement defense counsel took from witnesses McNearney 
had a "good faith intent to call" at trial. R. 214:11-12. Witnesses are not tied to one 
party or the other and often possess information helpful to both parties. See People v. 
Fowler, 390 N.E.2d 1377, 1383 (111. Ct. App. 1979) (holding a "witness is not the 
property of either party to a suit"). If notes of a witness's statement are wholly 
discoverable, then defense attorneys will be forced to choose between interviewing a 
witness thoroughly and chancing discovery of incriminating information, or leaving 
holes in the interview to avoid uncovering incriminating information. See Williams. 404 
A.2d at 37 (noting discovery order must not make "[djefense counsel... hesitant to 
make an in-depth investigation of the case for fear that inculpatory material would be 
disclosed which might have to be turned over to the State"). In either case, the defendant 
is denied full representation. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 Comment ("A lawyer should 
act with commitment and dedication to the interest of the client and with zeal in 
advocacy upon the client's behalf."). Instead, the trial court should consider the 
possibility of undiscoverable information within witness statements and review the 
statements as necessary to avoid discovery of inculpatory information. R. 214:11-12; see 
Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249,260 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J , concurring) ("Criminal 
justice could be administered much more rapidly if such rights [as the Sixth Amendment] 
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were not recognized and speed and efficiency were of overriding importance."). 
E. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated the Attorney-Client Privilege. 
Under the attorney-client privilege: 
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent 
any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client between 
the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's 
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of 
common interest. 
Utah R. Evid. 504(b). The communications addressed by the attorney-client privilege are 
the "advice given by the lawyer in the course of representing the client and includes 
disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's 
representative incidental to the professional relationship." Utah R. Evid. 504(a)(5). 
These communications are privileged "if not intended to be disclosed to third persons 
other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communication." Utah R. Evid. 504(a)(6). 
The attorney-client privilege represents a discovery exemption "deeply rooted in 
the common law and the Federal and State Constitutions." Knuckles, 650 N.E.2d at 976; 
State v. Kociolek. 129 A.2d 417, 424 (N.J. 1957) (noting attorney-client privilege was 
recognized by the common law as "a basic civil right, indispensable to the fulfillment of 
the constitutional security against self-incrimination and the right to make defense with 
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the aid of counsel" (citation omitted)). It "'is intended to encourage candor between 
attorney and client and promote the best possible representation of the client.'" Doe v. 
Maret 1999 UT 74,f7, 984 P.2d 980 (citation omitted).16 It is also "intended to be 
consistent with the ethical obligations of confidentiality set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct." Utah R. Evid. 504 Adv. Committee Note. Rule 1.6 
says, "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client. . . 
unless the client consents after consultation." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a). In other 
words, it protects the fundamental principles in the client-lawyer relationship that "the 
lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation" so the client 
is "encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing 
or legally damaging subject matter." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6 Comment. 
Here, the trial court erred by ordering McNearney to disclose information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. The requested witness list and witness 
statements were direct results of McNearney's private disclosures and defense counsel's 
16
 See Fowler, 390 N.E.2d at 1382 (holding "purpose of the privilege is to 
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys" because, "'[a]s a practical 
matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained 
from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the 
client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully 
informed legal advice5"); Kociolek, 129 A.2d at 425 ("The essential policy of the 
privilege is grounded in the subjective consideration of the client's freedom from 
apprehension in consulting his legal advisor, assured by removing the risk of disclosure 
by the attorney even at the hands of the law" because the "individual interest outweighs 
the public concern in the search for truth"). 
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advice. R. 214:4. They were created specifically to assist in McNearney's defense and 
were not intended to assist the prosecution. See. Misener, 698 P.2d at 647 (MA defense 
attorney often finds witnesses through the defendant, and interviews those witnesses 
using information given to him by the defendant. Thus, even if the privilege against self-
incrimination were to be limited to the defendant's own statements, it could be violated 
by a discovery order demanding witness statements made to the defense attorney or his 
agent."). However, the trial court's ruling ordered discovery of the witness list and 
witness statements before trial, when the prosecutor could leisurely sift though the 
private disclosures and incorporate any helpful disclosures in the State's case-in-chief. 
See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6 Comment ("A lawyer may not make use of information 
relating to the representation in a manner disadvantageous to the client.'1). 
F. This Court Should Reverse Because the Trial Court's Error Was Prejudicial. 
This Court should reverse regardless of prejudice because, by ordering defense 
counsel to disclose McNearney's witnesses, evidence, and witness interview notes, the 
trial court forced defense counsel to assist in McNearney's prosecution. See Glasser v. 
United States. 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942) (reversing without prejudice inquiry because 
"the right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow 
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its 
denial"), superceded bv statute on other grounds. Bourjailv v. United States, 483 U.S. 
171, 181 (1987); Scott. 519 P.2d at 785-87 (reversing without addressing prejudice 
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because the general discovery order violated the defendant's "fundamental constitutional 
right" against self-incrimination); State v. KelL 2002 UT 106,^15 n. 2, 61 P3d 1019 
(holding prejudice must be presumed where defendant suffers "a complete deprivation of 
the right to counsel"); McDonald. 922 P.2d at 779 ("The right to counsel has been well 
guarded by the courts as a fundamental constitutional right, and the Supreme Court cases 
have expressed 'that the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial.'" 
(citation omitted)); Melvins, 382 A.2d at 927 (holding "there should be no restriction 
upon the function of counsel in defending a person charged with a crime" because 
"[wjhen the right to effective assistance of counsel is impeded, a criminal proceeding is 
infected with the clear danger of convicting the innocent- a conviction which cannot be 
permitted to stand." (citations omitted)). 
Regardless, this Court should reverse because the trial court's discovery order 
prejudiced McNearney. "[A] trial court's error warrants reversal 'only if a review of the 
record persuades the [appellate] court that without the error there was "a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant."'" Mickelson, 848 P.2d at 691. 
For example, in Whitaker. the appellate court held the trial court's error in allowing 
discovery of witness statements was harmful because the State used the statements to 
impeach the defendant's "crucial alibi witness." Whitaker. 520 A.2d at 1019. 
Here, the discovery order was prejudicial because it forced defense counsel to 
reveal the defense's strategy and informed the State before trial that Newell would be a 
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crucial defense witness. R. 214:10-12. McNearney's defense was that Burwell, not he, 
committed the charged crime. R. 232:230-42. In support of his defense, McNearney 
called Newell, who testified Burwell had threatened to kill her, her family and 
McNearney if they implicated him in the charged crime. R. 231:168-75. However, the 
State was able to impeach Newell's testimony using information it gathered because of 
the erroneous pretrial discovery order. First, the State was able to impeach Newell by 
asking her about her attempted forgery conviction. R. 178-80. Absent the discovery 
order, the State would not have known Newell was a key defense witness and might not 
have researched her criminal history. See Misener, 698 P.2d at 647 (M[A] defendant 
suffers prejudice by association when a defense witness is impeached by evidence of 
prior convictions."). Second, the State was able to impeach Newell by asking her about 
statements she had previously made to the prosecutor. R. 175-76. Had the State not 
known Newell was a key defense witness, it would not have known to pay careful 
attention to Newell's pretrial statements and remember them for impeachment purposes. 
See Jackson, 623 So.2d at 413 (holding discovery of witness list not prejudicial because 
list not disclosed); Hereford, 537 N.W.2d at 70-73 (holding discovery of witness 
statements not prejudicial because "did not have a significant impact" on central issue). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse McNearney's conviction because the trial court abused 
its discretion by granting the State's request for general pretrial discovery. 
SUBMITTED this n* day of June, 2004. 
Ldkl<f SEPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM B 
U.S. Const amend. V - Right Against Self-incrimination 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI - Right to Full Representation of Counsel 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance 
of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV - Right to Due Process of Law 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12 - Rights of Accused Persons 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use 
of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 (2003) - Rights of Defendant 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the cotinty or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) - Work Product Doctrine 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court 
in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery 
or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, 
or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods 
set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: 
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, 
or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery 
is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, 
the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its 
own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivi-
sion (c). 
(b)(3) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision 
(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible 
things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for 
that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of 
the case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
vsubstantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery 
of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall 
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
11 Ligation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement nmceminp 
the action or its subject matter previously made by that p.ulv. Vp<m request 
a person not a party may obtain without the required showing n statement 
concernmg the action or its subject matter previously made lv that po^on If 
the request w refused, the person mav move for a court order. The provisions 
? 6 J 7 ( a ) ( 4 ) aPPJy t o t h e award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a 
written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved "by the person 
making it, or (B a stenographic, mechanical, e l e c t r i c a l other" ecord^g or 
l w ' ? K 1 0 f K t h e r e 0 f ' W h \C h iS a ^bateatially verbatim recital of an ora 
statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(c) - Prosecutorial Discovery 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(a)(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(aX2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(aX3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(a)(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(a)(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further 
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to 
prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses 
from harassment, abuse or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on 
the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psycho-
logical or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further 
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a contin-
uance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(h)(1) appear in a lineup; 
(h)(2) speak for identification; 
(h)(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(h)(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(h)(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(h)(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(h)(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(h)(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(h)(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time 
of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the 
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance 
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear 
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for 
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused 
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem 
appropriate. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
Utah R. Evid. 504(b) - Attorney-Client Privilege 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and 
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made 
lor the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the 
client between the client and the client's representatives lawvn-s, lawyer's 
representatives, and lawyers representing others in maMcr of common 
interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's lepresen-
tatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in any 
combination. 
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6 - Confidentiality of Information 
Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of information. 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a 
client except as stated in paragraph (b), unless the di^ut consents after 
consultation. 
(b) A lawyer may r*»veal such information to the extent the lawyer believes 
necessary: 
(bXl) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act 
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, 
or substantial injury to the financial interest or property or another; 
(b)(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in 
the commission of which the lawyer's services had been u>»ed; 
(b)(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client or to establish a defense to a criminal charge 
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved; or 
<b)(4) To comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
(c) Representation of a client includes counseling a law\er(s) about the need 
for or availability of treatment for substance abuse or psychological or 
emotional problems by members of the Utah State Bar serving on the Lawyers 
Helping Lawyers Committee. 
(Amended effective October 10, 1990; November 1. 199*.) 
ADDENDUM C 
Jurisdictions 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Rule 
Number 
Ala. R. 
Crim. P. 
16.2 
Alaska R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 16 
Ariz. R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 15.2 
Ark. R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 18.1-
18.3 
Cal. 
Const., art. 
I, §30; Cal. 
Penal Code 
§1054 et 
seq. 
Colo. R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 16 
Items discoverable bv prosecution1 
Nontestimonial identification;2 scientific and medical reports. 
Nontestimonial identification; expert witness names and 
addresses of any expert witnesses the defense plans to call at 
trial. 
Nontestimonial identification; all defenses defense intends to 
raise; names and addresses of defense witnesses; all papers, 
documents, photographs and tangible objects defense intends 
to use at trial. 
Nontestimonial identification; "[s]ubject to constitutional 
limitations," reports or statements of defense expert as well as 
the nature of any defense and the names and addresses of 
supporting witnesses. 
Names and addresses of any witnesses he intends to call, other 
than the defendant, as well as any relevant written statements 
or reports made by those witnesses; any real evidence 
defendant intends to introduce at trial. Cal. Penal Code 
§1054.3. 
Nontestimonial identification; reports or statements of experts 
made in connection with the particular case and the underlying 
facts or data supporting the opinion of expert witnesses; "the 
nature of any defense . . . which defense counsel intends to use 
at trial" and the names and addresses of supporting witnesses. 
Provisions requiring notice of affirmative defenses are not included. 
2
"Nontestimonial identification" may include appearing in a line-up, speaking for 
identification purposes, being fingerprinted, posing for photographs, trying on clothing, 
permitting the taking of specimens of material from under the defendant's fingernails, giving 
samples of blood, hair or other bodily materials involving no unreasonable intrusion into the 
defendant's body, providing handwriting samples, and submitting to reasonable physical and 
medical inspection of the defendant's body. 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Conn. 
Super Ct. 
R. §§40-
13,40-26, 
40-31. 
Del. Super. 
Ct. Crim. 
R. 16 
Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 
3.220 
Off. Code 
Ga. Ann. 
§§17-16-1 
et seq. 
Hawaii R. 
Penal Proc. 
R. 16. 
Idaho 
Crim. R. 
16. 
Names, addresses and statements of likely witnesses (other 
than the defendant); documents and tangible objects the 
defense intends to use at trial; expert reports and statements 
the defense intends to use or rely upon at trial. 
The defense may be required to turn over the following only if 
defense has first requested like materials from the prosecution: 
books, documents, and other tangible items material to the 
defense's case and intended for use at trial; "results or reports 
from physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or 
experiments . . . which the defendant intends to introduce as 
evidence in chef at the trial or which were prepared by a 
witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial;" 
Identity of expert witnesses and the substance of the opinions 
expresses. 
If Defendant elects to participate in discovery by serving a 
"Notice of Discovery" on the prosecution, Defendant may be 
required to provide nontestimonial identification; names and 
addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call as well as 
statements of any person, other than the defendant, expert 
reports, and tangible papers or objects Defendant intends to 
use at the trial or hearing. "On a showing of materiality, the 
court may require such other discover to the parties as justice 
may require." 
If the defendant opts to have discovery, then the defendant is 
required to disclose: expert reports the defense intends to use 
at trial; names, contact information and statements of 
witnesses to be called. 
In felony cases: nontestimonial identification; names and 
addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call; 
documents and tangible items the defendant intends to 
introduce; nature of defenses the defendant intends to rely 
upon. 
Documents and tangible objects the defendant intends to use at 
trial; physical, scientific or mental reports the defendant 
intends to introduce or which were prepared by witnesses the 
defendant intends to introduce at trial; names and addresses of 
witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial. 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
111. Super. 
Ct. R. 413 
none 
Iowa R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 
2.14(3). 
Kan Stat. 
Ann. 
§22-3212 
Kentucky 
R. Crim. 
Proc. 24. 
La. Code 
Crim. 
Proc. Art. 
724-728. 
Me.R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 16A. 
Md.R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 
4-263(d). 
Nontestimonial identification; "[s]ubject to constitutional 
limitation," defenses, expert reports, witness names and 
statements, and tangible evidence the defendant intends to use 
at trial; "Upon a showing of materiality, and if the request is 
reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure to 
the State of relevant material and information not covered by 
this rule." 
If the defense requests discovery of like items from the 
prosecution, the defense must disclose: documents and 
tangible objects which "are not privileged" and which D 
intends to introduce at trial; Scientific/medical reports the 
defense intends to introduce at trial. 
If the defendant requests like discovery, the defendant must 
disclose any scientific/medical reports and other documents 
and tangible objects the defendant intends to introduce at trial 
and which are material and which "do not place an 
unreasonable burden on the defense." 
If the defendant requests like discovery from the prosecution, 
the defendant must divulge scientific, mental or medical 
reports the defendant intends to introduce at trial or prepared 
by witnesses likely to be called at trial; documents and tangible 
items the defendant intends to introduce at trial. 
When the defendant requests like discovery from the 
prosecution, the defense must disclose: documents and other 
tangible objects the defendant intends to introduce at trial; 
physical, mental or scientific reports the defendant intends to 
use at trial or prepared by a witness the defendant intends to 
call at trial; notice of any defense based on mental condition. 
Nontestimonial identification; notice of intention to rely on 
defense based upon mental condition; documents and tangible 
objects the defense intends to use at trial; names and addresses 
of any expert witnesses the defendant intends to rely on at trial 
and reports of any such expert. 
Nontestimonial identification; expert reports that the defendant 
intends to use or which were produced by an expert witness 
the defendant intends to call at trial; "computer generated" 
evidence. 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Mass. R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 14. 
Mich. 
Comp. L. 
Service § 
767.94a;M 
ich. Court 
R. 6.201. 
Minn. R. 
Crim. 
Proc. 9.02 
Miss. Unif. 
R. Cir. 
County Ct. 
Prac. 9.04. 
Mo. S.Ct. 
R. 25.05, 
25.06. 
If Defendant requests like discovery from the prosecution, 
Defendant may be required to disclose: any material and 
relevant documents, tangible items, and reports the defendant 
intends to use at trial; names and addresses of witnesses the 
defendant intends to call at trial; notice of defenses of based on 
mental condition, license, ownership, authority, or exemption. 
Names and addresses of witnesses likely to be called; nature of 
expert defenses; expert reports the defendant intends to rely 
upon; documents or tangible evidence the defendant intends to 
use at trial; written or recorded statements of lay witnesses 
likely to be called at trial. 
Documents and tangible objects defense intends to introduce at 
trial and all mental, physical or scientific reports prepared by a 
witness defense intends to introduce at trial; any defense the 
defendant intends to raise at trial as well as any written or 
recorded statements of any witness likely to be called at trial; 
nontestimonial identification information. 
If Defendant makes similar requests, "subject to constitutional 
limitations," Defendant must disclose: names, addresses and 
statements of witnesses defense will call (except Defendant); 
physical evidence or photos the defense intends to introduce; 
expert reports, statements or opinions Defendant intends to 
rely upon. 
"Subject to constitutional limitation": nontestimonial 
identification; expert reports or statements the defendant 
intends to rely upon; names, addresses and statements of 
witnesses (other than the defendant) who defendant will call; 
documents and tangible objects the defendant will introduce; 
intention to rely on defense involving mental condition. 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New 
Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Mont. 
Code. Ann. 
§46-15-32 
3. 
§ 29-1916. 
Nev. Rev. 
Stat. 
§174.234-
174.245 
N.H. 
Super. Ct. 
R.98. 
N J. Ct. R. 
3:13-3. 
N.M. Dist. 
Ct.R. 
Crim. P. 5-
502. 
N.Y. Crim. 
Proc. Law 
§ 240.30. 
Nontestimonial identification; intention to introduce evidence 
of good character or rely on defense of compulsion, 
entrapment, justifiable use of force, mistaken identity; or 
mental condition and the names, addresses, reports or 
statements of supporting witnesses; names, addresses and 
statements and reports of all witnesses (except the defendant) 
including experts the defense may call; documents and 
tangible objects the defense may use at trial; additional 
discovery may be ordered if the prosecution shows substantial 
need and cannot obtain like information without undue 
hardship provided that such discovery does not violate the 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
If the defendant requests discovery of like items, the defendant 
may be required to allow prosecutorial discovery of: names, 
addresses and statements of likely witnesses, documents and 
tangible objects to be introduced; expert reports that will be 
relied upon by the defense which are material to the 
prosecution s case. 
Witness names, addresses, statements and summary of 
expected testimony; expert reports the defendant will rely 
upon; documents and tangible evidence the defense will use. 
Witness information and statements. 
Expert/scientific reports; documents and tangible objects of 
the defendant; names, addresses and statements of potential 
witnesses; written statements and recorded memoranda of 
state's witnesses; expert witnesses and qualification. 
Documents and tangible objects the defendant intends to 
introduce at trial; expert reports the defendant intends to 
introduce or prepared by witness the defense intends to call; 
names, addresses and statements of witnesses the defense 
intends to call. 
"Subject to constitutional limitations" the defendant must 
disclose: expert reports/documents the defense intends to use 
at trial; photos, drawings, tapes or recordings the defense 
intends to use at trial. 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
N.C. Gen. 
Stat. 
§§15A-
905, 15 A-
906. 
N. D. R. 
Crim. P. 
16(b). 
Ohio R. 
Crim. P. 
16. 
22 Okl. 
Stat. 
§2002. 
Or. Rev. 
Stat. 
§135.835 
Pa. R. 
Crim. P. 
573. 
R.I. Crim. | 
P.R. 
16(b). 
S.C. R. 
Crim. P. 5. 
If the defense requests discovery of similar items, the defense 
must turn over: documents and other tangible objects intended 
to be introduced; reports of mental or physical examinations 
the defense intends to introduce and all physical evidence the 
defense intends to use at trial. 
' If the defense requests discovery of like items from the 
prosecution, the defense must disclose: documents and 
tangible objects the defense intends to use during its case in 
chief; expert reports the defense intends to use at trial. 
If the defendant requests discovery of like items from the 
prosecution, the defense shall disclose: documents and 
tangible objects intended for use at trial; expert reports 
intended for use at trial; witness names and addresses; 
inconsistent witness statements after direct exam, as 
determined at an in camera review. 
Names, addresses and statements of witnesses (excluding the 
defendant) the defense intends to call; documents and tangible 
items the defense intends to use at trial. 
Names, addresses and relevant statements of witnesses 
(including the defendant) who will testify at trial; expert 
reports the defense intends to rely on at trial; documents and 
tangible objects the defense intends to introduce at trial. 
If the defendant has obtained similar discovery from the 
prosecution, upon a showing of materiality, and "subject to the 
defendant's rights against compulsory self-incrimination": 
expert reports intended for use at trial; names and addresses of 
eyewitnesses the defense intends to call at trial. 
If the defendant requests discovery from the prosecution, the 
defense shall disclose: documents and tangible items intended 
for use at trial; expert reports by intended witnesses; names, 
addresses and statements of witnesses, other than the 
defendant, the defense intends to call. 
If the defense requests discovery of like items, the defense 
shall disclose: documents and tangible items intended for use 
at trial; expert reports the defense intends to introduce at trial 
or prepared by witnesses the defense intends to call at trial. | 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
S.D. Cod. 
Laws. 
§§23A-13-
12 -- 23 A-
13-14. 
Tenn. R. 
Crim. P. 
16. 
Tex. Code 
Crim. 
Proc. Art. 
39.14. 
Ver. R. 
Crim. P. 
16.1. 
Va. Sup. 
Ct.R. 
3A:11. 
Wa. Crim. 
R. 4.7(b). 
W. Va. R. 
Crim. P. 
16. 
Wis. Stat. 
§971.23. 
Wy.R. 
Crim. P. 
16(b). 
If the defense requests discovery of similar items, the defense 
shall disclose: documents and tangible items the defense 
intends to introduce; expert reports the defense intends to use 
or prepared by experts the defense intends to call. 
If the defendant requests similar discovery from the 
prosecution, the defendant shall disclose: documents and 
tangible objects the defense intends to use at trial; expert 
reports the defendant plans to use or prepared by a witness the 
defense intends to call at trial. 
Names and addresses of any expert witnesses they intend to 
introduce as experts or whose work they intend to use at trial. 
"[S]ubject to constitutional limitations," the defendant may 
have to give nontestimonial identification; expert reports the 
defense intends to use or prepared by potential witness; names 
and addresses of potential witnesses. 
If the defense requests similar discovery from the prosecution: 
expert reports intended for use at trial 
Names, addresses and statements of trial witnesses; 
nontestimonial identification. 
i 
If the defense requests like information from the prosecution: 
documents and tangible evidence the defense will introduce; 
expert reports intended for use at trial; summary of expected 
expert witness testimony; names and addresses of defense 
witnesses. 
Witness names, addresses and statements (other than the 
defendant); defendant's known criminal record; physical 
evidence to be used at trial. 
If the defendant requests similar discovery from the 
prosecution: documents and tangible the defense intends to 
introduce at trial; expert reports the defense intends to use in 
its case in chief or prepared by witnesses the defense intends to 
call. 
ADDENDUM D 
MINUTES 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
14 June 1993 
Judicial Council Room, Administrative Office of the Courts 
Acting Chair, Kimberly Hornak 
Members Present: Members Excused: 
Judge David Young Judge Rodney Page 
Professor Lionel Frankel Philip R. Fishier 
David Schwendiman Judge Robin Reese 
Joan Watt
 J o carol Nesset-Sale 
Robert Stott Rodney Snow 
Ronald Fujino Brooke Wells 
David Thompson 
Guests: 
Kim Christy Staff: 
James Housley Mary T. Noonan 
l_ Minutes. Robert Stott. moved to approve the minutes of the 
5 May 1993 meeting. David Schwendiman seconded the motion. The 
motion carried unanimously. 
2. Proposed Amendments, Rule 16 - James Housley. Jim Housley 
discussed proposed amendments to Rule 16, Discovery. (See 
attached). The amendments were submitted by the Statewide 
Association of Public Attorneys of Utah. Members of the committee 
made the following remarks: 
(a) Mr. Stott questioned whether the rule could result in a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing, pending receipt of 
discovery. Mr. Housley expects that the rule will not affect the 
scheduling of a preliminary hearing. 
(b) Professor Frankel observed an ambiguity in section 
(b)(2). The clause »..., which the defendant intends to offer in 
evidence at the trial." appears to modify only the results rather 
than the entire examination, test, experiment or comparison. 
Professor Frankel also noted a discrepancy between sections (a) (3), 
reports of experts, and (b)(2), reports of experts. Section (a) (3) 
appears broader in scope than (b)(2). Mr. Housley stated that the 
d
"
f t e 5 s lnt^nd the rule to include only evidence which will be 
offered at trial. 
Criminal Procedure Advisory Committee 
June 1993 Minutes 
Page Two 
(c) Mr. Schwendiman stated that the proposed rule is much 
different from the federal rule, particularly with respect to the 
requirements in section (b) (5) . The section (b) (5) requirements 
are governed by caselaw in the federal system. He also observed 
that section (g) , sanctions, does not list revocation of pre-trial 
release. Mr. Housley responded that the omission is an oversight. 
(d) Ms. Watt questioned whether it is practical to expect 
that defense attorneys can meet the deadlines established in 
section (b). 
(e) Mr. Thompson commented that the breadth of defenses 
listed in section (b) (4) is troublesome. Mr. Thompson suggested 
that the rule should only include affirmative defenses-
Judge Young made a motion to create a subcommittee to study 
the proposal and return to the committee with recommendations at 
the committee's next meeting. Mr- Stott seconded the motion. The 
motion carried unanimously. Ms. Wells will chair the subcommittee-
Mr. Stott and Professor Frankel will serve as members. 
3. Rule 12 Subcommittee Report. The Rule 12 subcommittee reported 
that other states establish a time requirement (20 days) to file 
motions regarding the admissibility of evidence. The Utah rule 
allows such motions to be filed up to five days before trial. Mr. 
Stott made a motion recommending no change to the Utah rule. Mr. 
Stott further moved to disband the Rule 12 subcommittee. The 
motions carried unanimously. 
4. Adjourn. Ms. Hornak adjourned the meeting at 7:05 p.m. 
Minutes 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
14 February 1994 
Judicial Council Room, Administrative Office of the Courts 
Acting Chair, Philip R. Fishier 
Members Present- Members Excused-
Mary C. Corporon
 R o n a l d s_ F -ino 
Professor Uonel H. Frankel Neil A. Kaplan 
* H A ! !n e m a n J u d 9 e Rodney S. Page 
^ %H°™k Judge Robin W. Reese 
^ H H ! i f Rodney G. Snow 
B^e a wX 
Staff 
Brent M. Johnson 
L - - M'nU!!S* . B r ° 0 k e W e , , S m o v e d t 0 a p D r o v e t n e minutes of the January 10 1994 
uSnTouslT r 5 a d i n g ' R ° b e r t S l 0 t t S e C ° n d e d t h e m° t JOn- T h S m o t i o n c a r r i e d 
fnciina«lPrTl°m ^ ^ i 1 6 S u D C 0 m m i t t e e- Professor Frankel reported the 
materli d^r« SK°f.the RU,e 1 5 S u b c o m m ' ^ e . Professor Frankel first noted the 
matenal differences between the proposed Rule 16 and the current Rule 16: 
a*Hroia2 / a r a g r a p n <aK1) 9oes further than the current Rule 4 by requiring 
v ^ T m f . d d l ^ 6 3 5 6 ! ' bUVthe p r ° p 0 S e d ^ d o e s Protect tn* victims by stating that victims addresses need not be published. 
(b) Paragraph (a)(2) adds all memoranda. 
*vid«n£\n
 h
Para9raPnJa>(3) 9° e s beyond the present rule by adding all of the 
evidence to be produced at trial. 
ri*r*nJ£L • T h e m a i" c h a n 9 e s t0 t n e Proposed rule, in section (b) in which the 
wT^P™** ° d S d ° S e W i t n e S S 6 S a n d d e f e n s e s a n d a t an earlier date than required by the current rule. 
aanmSnnfiTnr ^ ^ n o t e d t n a t t h e SUDCOm™tt*e could not reach agreement on 
,trnnrT?hi^HP P ° S e d " ^ T w 0 ° f t h e t h r e e Committee members felt very 
strongly that the proposed rule would be too burdensome on defense attorneys. 
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particularly appointed counsel in rural areas. 
(A very spirited discussion on the merits of proposed Rule 16 ensued. Some of 
the highlights of that discussion follow.) 
Mr. Stott stated that the purpose of the proposed rule is to accelerate disclosure 
as all other requested items will eventually be disclosed. He asked the committee 
members to look at the cited case law for evidence that the rule is not 
unconstitutional. He asked the committee members to put aside their prosecution 
versus defense differences and ask whether the rule will make the system of justice 
better. He stated that the idea of "ambush" is gone, and the rule will help get to the 
truth. Mr. Stott believed that the burden on defense counsel was overstated. 
Brooke Wells believed that disclosing witnesses is closely tied to disclosing 
defenses, as witnesses may also disclose defenses. She stated that disclosing - ^ 
defenses will help the prosecution firm its case. She stated that this is a shifting of ^ - ^ 
the burden onto the defense. She stated that the burden on defense counsel will bev^r 
undo, as prosecutors will always have more resources. Ms. Wells stajted that most 
her cases are won on reasonable doubt, and defense has no obligation to help with 
reasonable doubt Ms. Wells stated that she does not object to disclosing defense^ 
such as alibi or disclosing medical experts, but objects to many of the other 
disclosures. Ms. Wells also stated that, if the defense is required to disclose it's 
witnesses, police, who are agents of the prosecution, may exert undue powers oveR _ 
the witnesses. She also noted that paragraph (3)(J) goes too far in allowing mental \ ^ 
Si examinations when mental capacity is not raised as a defense. ^ 
Philip Fishier asked the committee why disclosing the defense of alibi is ^ ^ | 
different from disclosing other defenses. Mr. Fishier framed the issue as: What is the 
system designed to do? Mr. Fishier also asked the committee what is the burden in 
having to disclose items ten days before trial, when the information will be disclosed 
eventually, noting that at sometime, a deadline must be placed. 
Professor Frankel noted that the defense of alibi involves time and place and if 
defense were required to only disclose at trial, the prosecutor would not have had time 
to check out the defense story. Professor Frankel noted that the argument for making 
the system of justice better would be more persuasive if prosecutors had made an 
appearance with the Legislature to speak out against problems with the victims4 nghts 
and other bills. Professor Frankel noted that the theory of expanding discovery is not 
a new idea, but has been around since the 1930s. He noted the abuses of d iscovery^ , ! 
in civil actions which could also occur in criminal actions. Professor Frankel also X ^ l 
noted that defense counsel may not know which witnesses or defenses they will use ^ r J 
until the prosecution has rested it's case at trial. Professor Frankel did see a < i ^ J 
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difference between disclosure of witnesses and defenses, noting that a reasonable 
shortening of time for disclosure of witnesses might be O.K., but disclosure of 
defenses tells the prosecution if it has a. good case. 
Mary Corporon noted that the system is not intended to lock people up, and it is 
designed to make the government overcome significant burdens in order to prove it's 
case. She also noted that the defense's case may not be set until trial, or until the 
prosecution rests its case. 
Kimberiy Hornak stated that some defense attorneys currently play "hide t h e ^ S 
ball." She noted that some defense experts do not appear until the day of trial, whichjS , 
does not allow the prosecution to prepare to rebut that witness. She sees a problenr^s^i 
in some pnvate attorneys who are paid more by their clients if they go to trial, and < b i % 
therefore they are withholding evidence that could result in a dismissal, simply to be ^ 
paid more. Ms. Hornak noted that the federal government and other states were 
following the proposed rule. 
Todd Utzinger stated that he was having a problem with the distinction between 
alibi and other defenses and requested that someone in the committee attempt to 
provide him with an explanation. Mr. Utzinger also saw a concern in having police go 
out and rattle witnesses who have been disclosed. 
Mr. Fishier eventually noted that the discussion was fairly well split along 
prosecution and defense lines and he felt that it would be best to have all committee 
members present, or provided an opportunity to be present before taking a final vote 
on action. In the mean time, it was decided that the subcommittee would again meet, 
with Ms. Homak being added as a member, to attempt to reach a compromise which 
might be more agreeable to the members. A motion was made to table the vote until 
the March 14 1994 meeting. Ms. Homak seconded the motion. The motion carried 
unanimously. 
Because of time constraints, the revisitation of Rule 8 was not discussed. 
3. Adjourn. Ms. Corporon moved to adjourn the meeting at 7:00 pm. Mr. Start 
seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously. 
AGENDA 
SUPREME COURT'S ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
Monday, March 14, 1994 -5:15 p.m. 
1. Welcome and Approval of February 14, 1994 Minutes Fishier 
2. Rule 16 Discussion Wells 
3. Letter from Lee EUertson and Rule 21.5 Discussion Fishier 
4. Rule 8 Discussion Wells 
5. Adjourn 
Minutes 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
U April L994 
Judicial Council Room, Administrative Office of the Courts 
Acting Chair, Philip R. Fishier 
Members Present: Members Excused-
Mary C. Corporon Ronald S. Fujino 
Professor Lionel H. Frankel Judge Rodney S. Page 
Robert K. Heineman Robert L. Stott 
Kimberly K. Hornak Todd A. Utzinger 
Honorable Robin W. Reese 
Rodney G. Snow 
Brooke C. Wells staff: 
Judge David S. Young Brent M. Johnson 
Honorable Christine M. Durham 
I. While waiting for a full quorum to attend, Justice Christine Durham gave an overview 
of the Supreme Court's relationship with the committee. Justice Durham discussed the 
concerns the Supreme Court has with all of it's committees and the relationship of the rule 
making process to legislation and the Legislature. The Supreme Courtis concerned about the 
Legislature doing an end run around the Supreme Court's rule making process. Justice 
Durham explained the limits of the committee directly contacting the Legislature. Justice 
Durham stated that committee members must refrain from testifying, lobbying, letter writing 
and similar activities as members of the committee. Justice Durham stated that this does not 
preclude members from doing activities in an individual capacity, if it is clear that the person 
is not acting as a member of the committee. Committee members should contact the court 
when the committee or a committee member receives a request to testify, state an opinion or 
otherwise become involved in the legislative process. Justice Durham stated that she does 
read the minutes of committee meetings and will be prepared to answer any questions that 
committee members may have. 
2. Minutes. Professor Frankel moved to approve the minutes without a reading. Judge 
Young seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously. 
3. Rule 16. Kim Hornak lead a discussion on the changes made by the subcommittee to 
the draft or Rule 16. Brooke Weils noted that there is a trend toward more disclosure in 
criminal proceedings and therefore there was compromise on both sides. 
Judge Robin Reese questioned whether there was a catch all provision in the rule 
requiring the prosecution to turn over evidence upon a showing of good cause by the defense. 
Robert Heineman noted that subsection (f)(1) covers those situations. Judge Reese noted that 
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subsection (f)(1) includes the standard "substantial need" rather than good cause. 
Judge Young asked the committee for it's opinion on the definition of "promptly." 
Professor Frankel noted thai the rule should not discourage people from calling witnesses, 
simply because they did not notify promptly. Rodney Snow noted a concern about ineffective 
assistance of counsel being raised simply because a person did not call a witness. The 
committee agreed that prompdy is an adequate word, which leaves sufficient discretion to^  
judges. \ f \ 
K 
Ms. Wells lead the discussion back to subsection (f)(1) concerning substantial need. 
Mr. Snow noted that good cause is a lesser standard than substantial need. Professor Frankel 
moved to modify subsection (f) requiring that the prosecution show substantial need while 5 ^ 
defense need show only good cause. Mary Corporon seconded the motion. The motion *=>^  
carried, with Judge Young offering the only descending vote. J 
Ms. Hornak then made a motion to approve Rule 16 as amended by the subcommittee 
and the committee. Ms. Wells seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously. 
4. Mr. Fishier lead the discussion on legislation to repeal Rule 21.5. A subcommittee 
was formed to further discuss the issue. The subcommittee was comprised of Robert 
Heineman and Todd Utzinger. Mr. Fishier instructed staff to prepare a letter to Lee 
Ellertson explaining that the committee is reviewing the legislation. 
5. Section 5 Rule 8. Ms. Wells lead a discussion on problems that her office is 
experiencing with Rule 8. Ms. Wells noted that persons are required to have capitol 
homicide experience, and her office is receiving many calls to second chair capitol cases. 
Her office does not feel comfortable having outside persons second chair these cases, because 
they must provide experience to their own people. Ms. Wells suggested a review of Rule 8 
to allow for qualification of persons, without excluding large groups of people. A 
subcommittee was formed to review the rule and make proposals to the committee. Ms. 
Wells will chair the committee with Ms. Corporon and Ms. Hornak also serving as members. 
6. Senate Bill 262. Mr. Fishier noted a request from Adult Probation and Parole to 
change Rule 22, to allow 40 days for sentencing. The request was made based on recent 
legislation which requires AP&P to file presentence reports ten days before sentencing, rather 
than two. Mr. Snow noted that from his experience, the State presentence reports are terrible 
and there is a strong movement to have the writing of reports taken away from corrections. 
Ms. Wells noted that efficiency does need to improve, but the recent legislation will not 
provide improvement. Judge Young expressed an opinion that the committee should wait and 
see if AP&P is able to implement the new legislation, before changing the rule. Judge Youm 
noted that if AP&P is unable to provide these reports within a quicker time frame, they 
should approach the governor to get more help. 
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Judge Reese moved to have this matter reviewed at the committee's September 1994-
meeting, after AP&P has had a chance to implement the legislation. Mary Corporon 
seconded the motion. The morion carried unanimously. 
7. The meeting adjourned at 7:15 p.m. 
MHJOTES 
SUPREME COURT" ADVXSORT COMMITTEE 
ON* THE. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
230 South 500 East, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Monday, May 8, 1995 5:15 p.m. 
PRESENT: 
Juage David Roth, Chair 
William Daines 
Brian Florence 
Ronald Fujino 
Judge Robin Reese 
Brooke Wells 
Professor Lionel Frankel 
Professor Paul Cassell 
Robert Heineman 
Mary Corporon 
STRFF: 
Brent: Johnson 
EXCUSED: 
Juage David Young 
Judge Rodney Page 
Rodney Snow 
Robert Stott 
I- INTRODUCTIONS Judge David Roth welcomed the members to the 
meeting ana introduced the two new Committee members, William 
Daines and Brian Florence. Professor Paul Cassell moved to adopt 
the minutes of the March 13, 1995 meeting. Ron Fujino seconded the 
motion. The motion carried unanimously. 
II. ROLE 8 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT: Brooke Wells provided the history 
of Rule b ana explained tne cnanges proposed by the subcommittee. 
The proposal deleces the word "capital" from paragraph (b) (2) and 
adds language to include persons who have negotiated a capital case 
been, involved in the guilt phase of a capital case, or been 
involved in past conviction relief in a capital case. Ms. Wells 
stated that deleting the word "capital" will*immediately qualify an 
additional nineteen attorneys. 
Judge Robin Reese questioned whether the trial of any homicide case 
will qualify, including a negligent homicide case. Ms. Wells 
stated that, as long as the attorney meets all of the other 
qualifications, a negligent homicide case would qualify. 
Robert Heineman stated that he has a concern with the educational 
experience requirement. He stated that the five year period should 
be shortened and perhaps an hourly figure included. Judge Roth 
questioned how difficult the current requirement is to comply with. 
Ms. Wells stated chat persons in rural counties have a tough time 
as most courses are out-of-state and would reouire a minimum of 
$1500-00 for tuition: and travel expenses-
Professor Lionel Frankel proposed to add the words "felony 
homicide" instead of "capital homicide." Professor Frankel stated 
that the uniqueness of a capital case is the emotion that is 
involved and he would like to see practitioners have experience 
with high stakes trials, rather than simply a negligent homicide 
case 
Mary Corporon stated that even a DUT case with death has unique 
issues that are relevant to capital cases and should not be 
excluded. These unique issues include dealing with an autopsy 
report, accident photos, etc. After brief discussion, Judge Roth 
questioned whether anyone wished to move for a change on the 
homicide issue. A change was not offered. 
The Committee discussed several possibilities on changing the 
education requirement. After a brief discussion and proposals, the 
Committee agreed that the Rule should be left as is. 
Judge Robin. Reese moved to adopt Rule 8 as proposed by the Rule 8 
subcommittee- Brian Florence seconded the motion. The motion 
carried unanimously -
III. RULE 16 SUBCOMMITTEE: REPORT: Professor Lionel Frankel stated 
that tne subcommittee aid not. have a final proposal yet for the 
Committee, but Professor Frankel wished to provide some background 
on the Rule- Professor Frankel stated that the Rule was drafted 
and proposed approximately one year ago- A number of comments were 
received questioning the Rule. The Attorney General and the Office 
of Legislative Counsel provided comment stating that the 
legislature had addressed related topics and the proposed Rule was 
inconsistent with legislative action- Professor Frankel stated 
that the subcommittee will be addressing those inconsistencies in 
its proposal. Professor Frankel stated that the UACDL had two 
major comments: (l)they argue that the current Rule should not be 
changed as defense attorneys shouldn't be reouired to provide 
discovery; and (2)they object to certain specific language in the 
Rule. Professor Frankel stated that he and Robert Stott agree that 
the subcommittee will not revisit the basic essence of the Rule, 
although some changes will be proposed. 
Robert Heineman presented an opposing view from the subcommittee 
stating that he sides with the UACDL and that the current Rul. 
s^Shnnlri not he au-pp*^. Mr. Heineman stated under the current rule, uj- • 
prosecution can obtain discovery from the defense if t h e O ^ 
prosecution needs it, but the provision is rarely used. Mr 
Heineman stated that discovery is not intended to be a leve 
playing field, the prosecution must carry its burdens. ' ^ ^ j 
William Daines stated that reciprocal discovery already exists, it 
is just not codified. After a brief discussion, it was decided 
that further discussion of the Rule will be postponed until the 
subcommittee can make final recommendations. The Rule will be 
discussed at the July meetings 
IV. RUIE 22r Professor Paul Cassell stated that he had reviewed 
recenu legislation, that may affect Rule 22 and victims rights-
Professor Cassell stated that he did: not perceive any changes that 
will be required because of legislation,, although he stated that 
the Committee may wish to looJc at the Rules in the future to 
incorporate language addressing victim impact- Judge Roth stated 
that the Committee will wait until there is a specific proposal 
before acting. 
V. ADJOOBN: There being no further business, the Committee 
meeting was adjourned at 6:50 p.m. 
3 
MINUTES 
SUEHEME COURT ADVTSORT COMMITTEE 
ou THE: RULES OF cRiMnnm EROCEDURE 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
230 South 500 East, S t e . 300 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84102 
Monday, August 14, 1995 
EXCUSED: 
Roane y~l>now 
Prof.~Lionel FranJcel 
Prof- Paul Cassell 
William Daines 
Judge David Young 
PRESENT: 
Juage David Roth, Chair 
Robert Keineman 
Michael Wims 
Brooke Wells 
John O'Conneli 
Brian Florence 
Mary Corporon 
STAFF: 
Brenc Johnson 
to the C o m ^ e T ^ J o n n ^ n f f f f * R ° ^ . n ^ o m e d the two members 
introduced themselves *£ t h e * £ £ £ ^ a M i c £ a e l Wims then brief ly 
members similarly followedwith ^ t ^ 2 6 m e n i b e r s and the Committee 
made by Brian Florence tc^ « ^ f ^ P r o d u c t i o n s . A motion was 
meeting. Robert: HeSSiaS s S S S I S ^ m i n u t ^ of the May 8, 1995 
unanimously.. tteineman seconded the motion. The motion carried 
c o n c e m i n g ^ H a ^ S a ^ r ^ r S f 1 1 r e ? o r * e d ^om the subcommittee 
again seated 5 S h e f e l t thl^l!*ft t 0 ^ U i e 16' Mr* l ineman 
Hememan explained some of t h , «S t ! • s n o u l a n ° * be amended. Mr. 
adding language I t a t i S a thath^ s T . tf= c o m m i^ee• s proposals, including 
to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ^ l i m i t a t i o n s * P a r r S ° f t h e r u i e a r e s u i 3 ^ c ? 
^ i S o S S ^ i ^ ^ S S WhetHhee%thf- s * - i d be a def ini t ion of 
informant as confidential i n ! L ^ i a i a e d t n a t " s e l a w defines 
adding language whichwould r l S S r ^ V . i Mr" ° * C o ^ l l suggested 
testimony would be relevant o f m f r e r f a ! ^ 8 " ^ a n i n f 0 C T ^ ' s 
should be. ^onnell stated that th i s i s the- way matters 
lichaei Wims stated that i f the* u 
constitutes an informant hhtt l£lre ,1S a body o f caselaw on what 
>ropose= and p a r t i s a n ^f c a s e ^ " " E i ? * ? . 1 * ? ^ " a y " i S 
•s an informant. e ~ a w c o J-^tigate whether a person 
Hrxam Florence questioned: the Comntittee as to whether a straw vote 
should be taken* to determine whether amendments to Rule 16 should 
be pursued.. Judge Roth questioned the Committee as to why Rule 16 
amendments were proposed in the first place _ 
Brooke Wells stated that the Committee was originally convinced 
that the legislature was going to thrust reciprocal discovery on 
litigants. The Committee felt that if it addressed the issue 
first, it could do a better and less expansive rule than the 
legislature. Ms. Wells explained that the legislature has adopted 
provisions for reciprocal discovery of expert witnesses, but has 
not addressed any other discovery issues. 
Mr. Heineman noted that the legislature has been waiting to see 
what this Committee would do with discovery before proceeding 
further. Mr. Wims noted that prosecutors are not currently 
pressing for legislative changes on discovery, but are waiting to 
see what this Committee does with the issue. 
Judge Roth stated that in 99% of all cases, discovery is not a 
problem. Mr. Heineman suggested sending a rule to the Supreme 
Court which reflects the best efforts of the Committee, along with 
an explanation as to the different positions among Committee 
members .-
Judge Roth conducted a straw vote of the members. Five members^ 
were opposed to any Rule IS" amendments. One member, Mr. Wims voted 
to proceed with amendment: proposals. The Committee therefore 
decided to discontinue Rule 16 efforts at this time. Staff was, 
instructed to prepare a resolution letter which will be sent to the^  
Supreme Court notifying it of the Committee's decision to ceaseN 
amendments on this Rule. The Committee noted that if future 
requests to review the rule are received, the Committee will reopen 
discussions. 
IIX. ADJOURN: There being no further business, the Committee 
adjourned at b:jo p.nu 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Prarwjnw 
Rule 16. Discovery1 
(a) Disclosure hv the prnsenirni-2 Upon written3 request of the defendant without order 
of the court, and if requested by the defendant,* as soon as practicable following the filing of 
charges and before the arraignment, the prosecutor shall disclose and permit the defendant to 
inspect, copy, photograph, or test the following: 
(1) Witnesses: the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecutor intends to 
call as witnesses at a hearing or in his or her case in chief at the trial, together with 
relevant written or recorded, statements or existing memoranda of any oral statements of 
such persons.3 Addresses of victims, who request that their addresses not be published, 
shall be provided only upon court order after finding that such disclosure is necessary 
'The proposed amended Rule 16 of die Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure creates opportunities and obligations regarding 
discovery beyond those granted or required by the current rule. The proposed role's purpose is to allow for discovery 
as broad as possible without impinging upon the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and without overburdening 
government. The principle of fairness underlies the proposed rule. Broad discovery will minimize the potential for 
undue delay and unfair surprise to either parry. Broad discovery will also enhance the search for truth by promoting the 
S T ™ £ E ° ^ , fee m yneral: State v. Stewart, 139 Ariz. 50, 676 P.2d 1108 (1984); State v. Davis. 63 Haw. 
191. 624P.2d 3/5(1981); People v. Mahdi, 45 Dl. Dec. 318, 89 111. App. 937, 412 N.E. 2d 669 (1980); State v. 
Wjme, 430 So. 2d 171 (App.), writ denied. 433 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1983). 
Subsection (a) was drafted to provide, as nearly as practical, the same provisions governing disclosure from the 
prosecutor as subsection (b) provides for the defendant to disclose. This subsection is intended to require as broad or 
broader disclosure by the prosecution than Che existing Rule 16. 
Written request was added to provide documentation as to the nature and amount of discovery requested. The existing 
practice m the Third District Courts has been to make discovery requests in writing. 
'The language "if requested by the defendant" was added to make it clear that there is no point in time that a requirement 
of automatic disclosure would kick in without the written request. 
Disclosure of the names and addresses of witnesses is prerry much standard procedure in the Third District Courts. The 
words in the first sentence of subsection (a)(1). "at a hearing or in his or her case in chief at the trial/ were added to 
make sure that none of the sancuons would apply if rebuttal witnesses were called without prior notice. Subsection (a)(1) 
does not require that statements be in writing or recorded or that memoranda of these statements be generated specially 
for discovery. See also footnote 19, infra. 
after balancing the interests of the victim: and the rights of the accused J* 
(2) Defendant's statements:- any relevant written or recorded statements or 
memoranda of any oral statements made by the defendant or codefendants.7 
(3) Reports of experts: * any reports, evaluations, or statements of experts, made in 
connection with the particular case which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at 
a hearing9 or in his or her case in chief at the trial,10 including results of physical or 
mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons. 
(4) Physical evidence:11 
(A) any books, papers, documents, diagrams, photographs, or tangible objects, 
or copies or portions thereof, which: the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence 
at a hearing or in his or her case in chief at the trial. 
(B) any physical evidence seized from the defendant regardless of whether the 
prosecutor intends to offer it in evidence at the trial.12 
(5) Criminal record: the defendant's criminal record.13 
6The second sentence in subsection (a)(1) was added out of concerns raised by victims. Legislation and/or a 
constitutional amendment incorporating this protection to a witness is anticipated. 
7Subsection (a)(2) was taken from subsection (a)(1) of the existing Rule 16. 
8See footnote 20, infra. 
9The language, 'at a hearing/ found in subsections (a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4)(A), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), and (b)(2) 
is intended to maice it clear that discovery applies for evidentiary hearing purposes as well as for trial purposes. 
l0See footnote 4, supra. 
llSee footnote 21, infra. 
l2Subsection (a)(4)(B) expands on the requirement in existing Rule 16 (a)(3) to make it clear that disclosure of everything 
seized from the defendant is required. 
Subsection (a)(5) was taken from Subsection (a)(2) of the existing Rule 16. 
(6) Exculpatory evidencsr evidence known to the prosecutor which: tends to negate 
or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment.14 
(b) Disclosure bv the defendant:15 Upon written request of the prosecutor, without order 
of the court,16 and, if requested by the prosecutor,17 within 30 days after the arraignment, but 
in no case later than 10 days before the hearing" or trial:18 
(1) the defendant shall disclose to and permit the prosecutor to inspect, copy, 
photograph, or test the following: 
(A) Witnesses: the names and addresses of persons whom the defendant 
intends to call as witnesses at x hearing* or at the trial, together with relevant 
written or recorded statements or existing memoranda of any oral statements of 
,4Subsection (a)(6) was taken from Subsection (a)(4) of the existing Rule 16. 
One of the* central purposes of the proposal to amend existing Rule 16(c) as reflected in 16(b) of this droit was to 
provide a rule which: 
a, mandated disclosure from the defendant to the prosecution upon the-prosecutor's request (i.e. discovery rules 
and. statutes from 14 states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois. Indiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New Yoric^  and Oregon) as opposed to requiring prior court order (i.e. discovery 
rules and statutes from 15 states including Utah's present Rule 16: Alaska, Colorado, Iowa. Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin); and 
b. did not condition die prosecutor's opportunity for discovery upon discovery requests from the defendant (i.e. 
discovery rules and statutes from instates: Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia and Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 16, and the District of Columbia.) 
Procedural rules allowing for broad mutual discovery have widely been upheld as constitutional, simply 
requiring a defendant to disclose what he will shortly reveal at a hearing or trial. Rules such as the present proposed 
Rule 16 at most accelerate the time certain evidence is disclosed. See WHliams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78 (1970); State 
v. Nelson. 14 Wash. App. 658, 545 P.2d 36 (1975); Kellv v. Marion Countv. 262 Ind. 420, 317 N.E. 2d 433 (1974); 
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Explanatory Note to Rule 16. 
IdThis portion of Subsection (b)(1)(B) is patterned after provisions in Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02, 
subd.i(l). 
See footnote 4, supra. 
The time limit in subsection (b) is intended to maximize the usefulness of the defendant's disclosures to the prosecution. 
Flexibility is insured by subsection (d). The language is taken from New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
5-502(A). See also footnote 9, supra. 
such: person other thait the defendant.1* 
(B) Reports of experts:20 any reports, evaluations, or statements of experts, 
made in connection with the particular case which the defendant intends to offer 
in evidence: at a. hearing: or at the trial, including results of physical or mentaL 
examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons. 
(C) Physical evidence:21 any books, papers, documents, diagrams, 
photographs, or tangible objectsr or copies or portions thereof, which the 
Rules requiring a criminal defendant to disclose the names, addresses, and statements of witnesses have largely been 
upheld as not violating the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination because such rules do not oblige disclosure 
of the defendant's own statements. Sec-People v. Small. 631 P.2d 148, cere, denied 454 U.S. 1101 (1981); People v. 
Larsen. 361 N.E.2A713 HI. (Ann.), affirmed 385 N.E.2d. 679 (HI.), cerr. denied 444 U.S. 908 (1977); State v. Hardin. 
558 So.W.2d 804 (Mo. App. 1977); People v Damm. 2*N.Y.2d 256, 247 N.E.2d 65 L (1969) 
Also, the act of handing over witnesses' names, addresses, and statements, as well as other evidence covered 
by the rule,, is not testimonial or communicative in. nature and therefore does- not violate the- privilege. See Izazgaj^ 
Superior Court.. 285 CaL Rptr.. 655. 23 J Cal. App.3d.670 (App. 4th Dist. 1991); People v. Cooicotto. 50 N-Y. 2d 222. 
428 N.Y.S.2d. 649, 406 N.E.2d 465 (1980). See in general Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Application of 
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Ihcrimination to Compulsory Production of Documents. 48 L.Ed 2d 852. 
Furthermore-, broad discovery rules have been, widely held-to not violate-the work product privilege, the right 
to privacy, the* right to effective- assistance- of counsel, and the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Nobles, 
422 US. 225 (1975); United States v. Bump. 605 F.2d 548 (10th Or. 1979); People v. Small. 631 P.2d 148, cer^ 
denied 454- U.S. 1101 (1981); People v. Pike. 7L Cal.2d 595, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672, 455 P.2d 776, cert, denied 406 U.S. 
971 (1972); People v. Allen- 104 Misc.2d 136, 427 N. Y.S.2A 698 (1980). 
For similar provisions in other states see: Minnesota. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02 subd.l(3)(b); 
Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 413(d)(i); Connecticut Superior Court Rules, §769(1); Missouri Rules of Court, Rule 
25.05(A)(2); New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5-502(A)(3); Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
15.2(Q(1M*); California Penal Code § 1054.3(a); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in Criminal Matters), § 135.835(1); 
and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule 111(A)(2). 
20Subsection (b)(1)(B) is patterned after provisions in the following states: Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
9.02 subd.l(2), Illinois Supreme Court Rules Rule 413(c); Connecticut Superior Court Rules, §§769(2), 770; Missouri 
Rules of Court, Rule 25.05(A)(1); New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5-502(A)(2)t (B); Arizona Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 15.2(c)(2); Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(c); Maine Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 16A(2); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 16(c)(2); New York Criminal Procedure Law, §240.30(l)(a); 
California Penal Code, § 1054.3(a); Maryland Court Rules, Rule 4-263(d)(2); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in 
Criminal Matters), §135.835(2); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule IH(A)(4). 
21Subsection (b)(1)(C) is patterned after provisions in the following states: Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
9.02 subd.l(l); Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 413(d)(ii); Connecticut Superior Court Rules, §769; Missouri Rules 
of Court, Rule 25.05(A)(3); New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5-502(A)(l)(B); Arizona Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule I5.2(c)(3),(d); Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(a); Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule l6A(a)(l); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 16(c)(1); New York Criminal Procedure Law, §240.30(l)(b); California Penal 
Code § 1054.3(b); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in Criminal Matters), §135.835(3); and Indiana Municipal Court 
Rules, Rule 111(a)(3). 
defendant intends: to offer in evidence at a hearing- or at the triaL 
(2) Notice of Defense^22 The defendant shall inform the prosecutor in writing21 
of all defenses, mitigations, and. justifications, other than of not guilty or no contest, 
which, the defendant intends to assert at the trial, including but not tfmited to alibi, 
insanity, diminished capacity, self-defense, defense of others, defense of habitation, 
compulsion, consent, necessity, mistake of feet, mistaken identity, reliance on public 
authority, entrapment, voluntary termination, voluntary and involuntary intoxication, 
impotency, extreme emotional disturbance, imperfect justification, and insufficiency of 
a prior conviction.2* The defendant shall supply the prosecutor with the names and 
addresses of persons whom the defendant intends to call as witnesses at the trial or 
hearing.23 
( 3 )
 The person of the accused:26 subsequent to the filing of the indictment or 
information, and upon written request of the prosecutor, the defendant shall, at the time 
and place designated in. the request: 
^ p o r t i o n of Subsection (b)(2) was patterned aner provision in Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02 
suod.l(j)(a). 
^ p o r d o n of Subsection (b)a) was patterned after provisions in the foUowing states: Minnesota Rules of Criminal 
£ r S S , f ^ i T (3XaJ COOaCCriCUt S U P e r i ° r C ° U n R u I e 3 ' § 7 5 8 ; « * ***><» »•••» * Criminal Procedure, Kule 15.2(b). See also footnote 3 t supra. 
^ i r l i T ^ V ^ T ^ f ° r P r 0 s e c u r i o n d i s c o v « y of defenses see: Minnesota Rules of Criminal 
R ^ ^ t i 7 « I ( 3 ) ( a ^ m i n 0 i s S "P r e m e C o u * R u l « . *•«•• 413(d) and (d)(iii); Connecticut Superior Court 
S T l S 2 2 1£VJ « ^ Missouri Rules of Court. Rule 25.05(A)(4H5); Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 15.2(b); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule IH(1). 
» R r comparable provisions in other states see: Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 9.02 subd.l(3)(a); Illinois 
vEZ* R u T e ^ S . i W * " T " * RUlCS ° f C 0 U n - R u l e 2 5 - ° 5 < A ^ ^ « * * * » » Rules of Criminal rroceaure, xuie U.2(o). See also footnote 9, supra. 
^Subsection (b)(3) recodifies with some additions (see footnotes 27, 28, and 29. infra.) subsection (h) of the existing 
(A) appear iit x line-up;. 
(B) speak for identification by witnesses to an offense; 
(Q be fingerprinted,, palmprinted, footprinted, or voiceprinted; 
(D) pose for photographs not involving a re-enactment of a scene or event; 
(E) try on articles of clothing; 
(F) permit the taking of specimens of material from under the defendant's 
fingernails;27 
(G) permit the taking of samples of the defendant's hair, blood, saliva, urine, 
and other specified materials which involve no unreasonable intrusions of the 
defendant's body; 
(H) permit the talcing- of a dental impression;28 
Q) provide specimens of the defendant's handwriting; 
(J) submit to reasonable physical, medical, or mental29 examinations; 
(K) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
^Fingernail scrapings are added to the list of examinations which may be performed on the defendant contained in 
existing Rule 16(h) and is similar to provisions in the following states: Missouri Rules of Court, Ruie 25.06(B)(7); 
Maine Ruies of Criminal Procedure, Ruie 16A(b)(2)(A)(vi); Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02 
subd.2(l)(f); Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 413(a)(vi); Connecticut Superior Court Rules §778(6); Arizona Ruies 
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15.2(a)(6); Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(b)(6); Maryland Court Ruies, 
Rule 4-263(d)(l); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Ruie 111(B). 
28
 Dental impressions are added to the list of examinations, enumerated in existing Ruie 16(h), which may be performed 
on a defendant. Proposed Rule 16(b)(3)(H) finds support in other states' provisions allowing for further reasonable 
physical inspections or examinations performed on a defendant in addition to those enumerated in existing Rule 16(h)(1)-
(9) and proposed Rule 16(b)(3)(A)-(G), (JMK). For examples see the following provisions: Minnesota Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Ruie 9.02 subd.2(l)(h); Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 4i3(a)(ix); Connecticut Superior Court 
Rules, §778(10); Missouri Rules of Court, Ruie 25.06(9); Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15.2(a)(8); 
Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(b)(8); Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16A(b)(2)(A)(ix); 
Maryland Court Ruies, Rule 4-263(d)(l); and Indiana Municipal Court Ruies, Ruie 111(B)(9). 
29Mental examinations are added to the list of examinations which may be performed on the defendant contained in 
existing Ruie 16(h)(8) and is similar to provisions in Maryland Court Ruies, Rule 4-263(d)(i). 
Whenever the personal appearance: of the accused is required for the foregoing: purposes-, 
reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given by the 
prosecutor to the defendant and defense counseL The defendant shall be entitled to the 
presence of counseL30 Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with the 
requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, without reasonable 
excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence 
in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning 
the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should 
deem appropriate.31 
(C) rnf
°™*tion nor subject to disc ing-* Except as to scientific or medical reports," 
this rule does not authorize the discovery and inspection of: 
(1) Work pmdnrr* legal research or records, correspondence, reports, 
memoranda, or internal documents,, to the extent that they contain the mental 
3 0 - , . 
of Criminal Procedure Rule 5 V a ^ Z Z p , tr C o n a e c n « " Supenor Court Rules §781(1); Arizona Rules 
Court Rules, Rule S ) ^ ^ * * " °' C n m m a l P r 0 c e d u r e ' R u l e l«A(b)(2)(B); and Indiana Municpal 
^ l i o ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 ' 7^™°° « ** " " *"** ° f *« « * * * * * * » • *>r similar 
T c n ^ M a t s T l l S 865 " "*""* ^ ^ *** l 6 A<«* "d 0 r e *>* * * - * » — (Procedure 
« £ o t e f Z w h t r r "in3 Z 7 Z \ 1iV* " ^ ~ " " *" * W ' ~ - ^ ' ^ " " « thai some flexibility rem*™ u ^ r ,h T controversy „ Utigation under exisang Rule 16. It is intended 
separate r u i e s Z e n a i n T S > T " ^ * " ^ '""**« * ^P'"6*1 ' « « P d o n s c o n t a * e d » * • 
pro men under those rules and under subsecaon (f) of this proposed Rule 16. 
^ ^ J ^ Z ^ C ^ u T PDr°VidinS * * e X C e p d 0 n t 0 S u b s e C O o a (c> ~ Atabwa Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(d), Tdaho Court Rules, Rule 16(8); and Connecticut Superior Court Rules, §773. 
^See Rule 26(b)(3), U.R.C.P. 
impressions^ conclusions,, opinions,, or Iega£ theories of respective counsel J5 
(2) Defendant's statements:36 statements made by the defendant to the defendant's 
attorneys or the attorney's agent.37 
(3) Informants:38, an informant's identity, except where the informant will testify 
in the particular case. 
(d) Timing of request and disclosure:39 Upon motion and for good cause shown, the court 
may extend or shorten the time within which the parties must make the above disclosures. 
(e) Continuing duty to disclose:40 If, prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional 
evidence or material previously requested or ordered under the provisions of this rule, such party 
shall prompdy notify the court and the opposing party of the existence of the additional evidence 
or material-
(f) Court orders: 
Subsection (c)(1) may be somewhat, narrower than, the-worlc product exception in Rule 26(b)(3), U.R.C.P. since it 
applies only to the- mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of counsel. For similar provisions in. 
other states see: Minnesota.Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.Q2.subd.3; Connecticut Superior Court Rules §773(1)-
(3); Missouri Rules of Court, Rule 25.10(A); New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5-502(c)(l); Alabama 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(d); Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16A(4); Idaho Courr Rules, Rule 
16(f),(g); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in Criminal Matters), § 135.855(l)(a); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, 
Rule IV(c)(l). 
36See Rule 504, U.R.E. 
^It is intended that Subsection (c)(2) would be limited to attorneys' staff members including on-staff investigators and 
investigators specially hired or retained by the attorney to investigate the case under consideration. For similar provisions 
in other states see: New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5-502(c)(2); Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 16.2(d); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 16(g); California Penal Code, § 1054.3(a); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure 
in Criminal Matters), §135.335(1); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule 111(A)(2). See also footnote 19, supra. 
3
*See Rule 505, U.R.E. For similar provisions from other states see: Missouri Rules of Court, Rule 25.10(B); Oregon 
Revised Statutes (Procedure in Criminal Matters), §135.855 (l)(b); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule IV(c)(2). 
See Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(a),(c). 
^Subsection (e) recodifies the last sentences of existing Rule 16(b) and (d) respectively. For similar provisions from 
other states see: Missoun Rules of Court, Rule 25.08; Alabama Rules of Cnminal Procedure, Rule 16.3; Maine Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, Rule L6A(a)(5); Idaho Court Rules, Rule i6(i); and Maryland Court Rules, Rule 4-263(h). 
(0 Additional disclosures^ -"- Upon: motioa by either party showing- substantial need: 
for relevant material or information not subject to the- above provisions and. not otherwise 
obtainabler and subject to constitutional limitadons- and privileges, the court in its 
discretion may require the parties to disclose such, material and information. 
(2) Protective order??:42 Either party may apply for a protective order for non-
disclosure of requested discovery. 
@) Findings of fact and conclusions of 1aw« The court, upon issuing an order 
under subsections (1) and (2) of this subsection, shall file written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
(g) Sanctions;44 If, at any time during the course of the proceedings, it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from 
introducing: evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
(h)45 The fact that a party has indicated an intention to offer specified evidence or call a 
41 
Subsection (f)(1) is intended to give the court limited discretion to expand required disclosures beyond what is otherwise 
2 2 t l B £ £ - M°Ut P r i ° r i W e r v e n d o n b>' * • c o u « - S«**«*°n (0(D » intended to work in tandem with 
w w
 , ~ °
u w
 P e m " m e c o u r t t o appropriately protect such expanded, disclosure or to seal, for appeal 
purposes, materials submitted m camera should the court deny a motion to require disclosure. 
42. 
l ^ . S T J - J ^ ^ P r 0 V i S i 0 n S fr°m 0 t h C r S t t t t S " * M a i n e R u l " o f C r i m i a a i Procedure. Rule 
16^  SLSlTrZtTf %°T *Sf\RBto I V ( E ) : M i S S ° U r i R U 1 " ofCo^ R u " 25.11; Idaho Court Rules. Rule 16<k). Maryland Court Rules, Rule 4-263(i); and Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in Criminal Matters), §135.873. 
43T*e requirement of findings and conclusions found in Subsection (f)(3) supplements Subsections (f)(1) and (2) and is 
intended to preserve discovery issues for appeal. 
Subsection (g) is the existing Rule 16(g) verbatim. 
45Subsection (h) is mtended to prevent comment upon, or allusion to, the fact that a party provides discovery but does 
atou" t a^wTy ""*** " *""" " ^ U ° d * P " * S U b S C C t i°n * w o u i d b« Appropriate to let the jury know 
specified; wimess is not admissible ire evidence at a. subsequent hearing: or triaL 
(i)46 The requirements of this rule are in addition to all other statutory requirements. 
"Subsecnon (i) is intended to make it clear that this proposed Rule 16 does not supersede or preempt other statutory 
provisions. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs, 
SANDRA SPRY, aka SANDRA 
CHLOPTISKY, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20000244-CA 
Priority No. 10 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3 (2) (d) U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is a Defendant in a criminal case entitled to a copy of 
her written complaint, and her taped testimony, given to the police 
department, in conjunction with an internal affairs complaint 
brought against the arresting officer in the incident for which she 
is charged? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's Motion to 
Compel Discovery (R. 30-33). On appeal, the appellate court 
accords no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions, but 
reviews them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991) . 
2. Is the State entitled to blanket discovery against a 
1 
criminal Defendant, without a particularized showing of good cause, 
pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's Memorandum 
in Opposition to States' Motion to Discover (R. 37-39) . On appeal, 
the appellate court accords no deference to a trial court's legal 
conclusions, but reviews them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of 
N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in relevant part, 
provides as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following material of 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or codefendants; 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the 
defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as 
required by statute relating to alibi or insanity, and any 
other item of evidence which the Court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in 
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
§63-2-3 04 U.C.A. Protected Records. 
The following records are protected if properly classified by 
a governmental entity: 
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal or 
administrative enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for 
discipline, licensing, certification, or registration 
purposes, if release of the records: 
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with 
investigations undertaken for enforcement, discipline, 
licensing, certification, or registration purposes; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with 
audits, disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings; 
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a 
right to a fair trial or impartial hearing; 
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(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the 
identity of a source who is not generally known outside 
of government and, in the case of a record compiled in 
the course of an investigation, disclose information 
furnished by a source not generally known outside of 
government if disclosure would compromise the source; or 
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose 
investigative or audit techniques, procedures, policies, 
or orders not generally known outside of government if 
disclosure would interfere with enforcement or audit 
efforts; 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
Defendant appeals an Order denying her Motion to Compel 
Discovery in this matter, and granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Discovery. Motions for Discovery were heard by the Court on 
February 22, 2000. The Order denying Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Discovery and granting Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery was dated 
March 22, 2000. 
Statement of Facts 
On or about August 6, 1999, at around midnight, Defendant 
approached an automated teller machine at her bank, in an attempt 
to make a late night mortgage payment. A police officer parked 
across the street, observed her, and determined that she looked 
"suspicious". He crossed the street, asked her to explain her 
presence at this strange hour, and claimed to have observed an open 
container of alcoholic beverage in her open convertible car. One 
thing led to another and the officer placed Defendant under arrest 
for interfering with his investigation. He then indicated he found 
a duffle bag in the back seat of the car containing a controlled 
substance and drug paraphernalia. The car was impounded, and 
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shortly thereafter destroyed by fire, while in the control of South 
Salt Lake police. 
Defendant, believing that she was roughed up and that her car 
was wrongfully destroyed, filed an internal affairs complaint 
against the officer and the backup officer assisting him. A 
hearing was held, which was taped. A determination was made by 
South Salt Lake police that there was no cause for the internal 
affairs complaint. 
Defendant requested a copy of her statements made as part of 
the internal affairs complaint, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing her to discover "relevant 
written or recorded statements of the Defendant or Co-Defendants". 
Defendant's general Request for Discovery was filed on November 1, 
1999 (R. 11-12) . When the State refused to produce the statements, 
Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (R. 30-33) . 
Plaintiff filed a general Request for Discovery from 
Defendant, seeking addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of birth 
of all proposed witnesses for Defendant. Plaintiff also sought an 
opportunity to inspect any physical evidence, copies of any 
documents which Defendant intends to use at trial, and reports 
prepared by defense investigators (R. 43-45) . 
The discovery issues were argued before the Court on February 
22, 2000, resulting in a denial of Defendant's Motion to compel, 
and a granting of Plaintiff's discovery motion. The Order was 
entered on March 22, 2000; and Defendant filed her Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal with this Court on March 27, 2000. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant made a written Complaint against the arresting 
Officer in this incident, with the South Salt Lake City Internal 
Affairs Officer. She also made a taped statement as a result of 
the Internal Affairs investigation. The written and taped 
statements included details of her activities, as well as those of 
the Officer, before and during the incident resulting in these 
charges. Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, she is entitled to copies of all such written and 
recorded statements. Nothing contained in the Rules or the Utah 
Code prohibit her from obtaining the statements, which are 
necessary in order for her to prepare her defense. 
The State of Utah is not entitled to blanket discovery against 
her, as ordered by the Court. The Rules of discovery, and bodied 
by Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, did not grant 
such broad discovery right. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Criminal Procedure considered additions to the Rule 
broadening discovery as requested herein, and refused to adopt such 
rule changes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A COPY OF HER PREVIOUS STATEMENT, MADE 
IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN INTERNAL AFFAIRS COMPLAINT, AGAINST THE 
ARRESTING OFFICER. 
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Defendant in this action filed an internal affairs complaint 
linst the officers who arrested her. A hearing was held, and a 
>e was made. A request was made by Defendant's civil attorney, 
the City of South Salt Lake, for a copy of the original internal 
Eairs complaint and the tape, which was denied. A copy of that 
aial is attached as Addendum B to this brief. The complaint and 
e tape are written and recorded statements of the Defendant in 
ich she set forth her version of the facts of this case. 
quests, under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
re also denied by the Prosecutor. Defendant is entitled to the 
'itten and recorded statements she made, in conjunction with this 
icident, pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1), to prepare her defense. 
The State maintains that the statement is a protected one 
ider GRAMA and that only the officer and his attorney have access 
D this tape. If the State obtains a copy from the South Salt Lake 
ity Attorney, they claim that they must not, under GRAMA, share it 
ith defense counsel. 
This statement was made to the police, detailing the 
ccurrences leading her to be arrested and charges to be filed. 
bviously, it is "relevant". The Court, in its Order, denied the 
equest and stated that: 
. . .the internal affairs complaint was not in conjunction 
with the arrest or this event. It is a whole separate event. 
It is not a part of the investigation or a product of the 
investigation. 
This is a statement which the police can and will use in 
preparing for trial. Defendant's counsel must be aware of the 
contents of the statement, in order to prepare. 
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In the City's reply to civil counsel's request for this same 
information under GRAMA, the City stated as follows: 
Your request for the internal affairs reports and statements 
are considered "private and protected" under the provisions of 
the Government Records Access and Management Act, Section 63-
2-101, et. seq. Specifically Sections 63-2-302 and Section 
63-2-304, U.C.A. 
The City's position on this appears to be self contradictory. 
Either the records are "private" or they are "protected". The 
categories are mutually exclusive. If the records are private, 
they must be disclosed to "the subject of the record". A complaint 
by a citizen against a policeman clearly has two subjects. The 
complaint is of an incident in which the criminal defendant came 
into contact with the offending police officer. The complaint, and 
the tape of the hearing, it can be assumed, detail the actions of 
both of the parties to the incident. Under §63-2-2 (1) (a) U.C.A., 
Defendant is clearly entitled to a disclosure of this record, if 
the record is designated as private. 
The State, in the trial court, however, argued that the record 
was properly designated as protected. Though the State filed 
nothing in writing detailing their contention, it appears that 
their argument concentrates on §63-2-304(9). That section protects 
against discovery of records kept for administrative enforcement 
purposes, or for discipline. It would appear that the records of 
the internal affairs complaint may come under this protection. The 
protection, however, is conditional. The records are only 
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protected if they meet any of five criteria: (a) they might 
interfere with the investigation (b) they might interfere with 
disciplinary proceedings (c) they might deprive a person of a right 
to a fair trial or impartial hearing (d) they might disclose a 
source kept confidential by the government, or (e) they might 
disclose investigative or audit techniques. 
The complaint was written by Defendant; and the taped 
statement of Defendant was voluntarily given by her. No secret 
information is contained in either of these items. There are, 
however, details of the incident, remembered shortly after the 
incident occurred, which might assist in presenting a defense. No 
prejudice can occur to the arresting officer, as the internal 
affairs complaint has been dismissed as unsubstantiated. Thus, 
none of the conditions specified by statue as justifying the 
protection of these records, have been met. 
The statements almost certainly will assist in presenting the 
State's case. Pursuant to §63-2-206 U.C.A. one government agency 
is allowed to provide a protected record to another government 
agency if the second agency: 
Enforces litigates, or investigates civil, criminal, or 
administrative law, and the record is necessary to a 
proceeding or investigation; 
It is obvious that the State will have access to these 
statements made by Defendant, if they so choose In the trial 
court, the State suggested that they did not intend to use such 
information against Defendant. The existence and availability of 
detailed statements by Defendant as to what occurred between her 
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and the police officer, however, are likely to be strong 
temptations. While Defendant may be able to control the 
introduction of such statements at trial, she certainly cannot 
control whether the prosecutor reviews them in her case 
preparation. Here we have a prosecutor who has been most 
aggressive about asking the Court for assistance in getting any 
known evidence which Defendant may have for her defense. Can that 
same prosecutor be trusted to avoid even looking at probative 
evidence which is easily within her grasp? 
The statements certainly are relevant written and recorded 
statements within the Rule 16. Nothing contained in the Government 
Records Access and Management Act prohibits Defendant's access. 
Therefore, the decision of the trial court in denying Defendant 
access to this information is without legal foundation. 
POINT II 
THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO BLANKET DISCOVERY OF DEFENDANT'S 
CASE, PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE. 
This is a criminal action in which discovery is governed by 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule sets 
particular things that "the accused may be required" to provide, 
including to appear in a lineup, to provide specimens of 
handwriting and to submit to certain physical examinations. 
Additionally, Rule 16(c) provides as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense 
shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required 
by statute relating to alibi or insanity, and any other item 
of evidence which the Court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
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prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
The State in this matter asked for names and addresses of 
witnesses, the right to inspect documents, investigator 
reports, and other items. None of this material is covered by 
the rule. The rule, of course, is flexible, allowing other 
items to be produced "on good cause shown". The State's 
Motion was defective under the rules, as it made no attempt to 
provide good cause. Nevertheless, the Court ruled in the 
State's favor: 
The State has filed a Motion for Discovery, to discover names 
of witnesses, proposed testimony, and also copies in advance 
of exhibits. Defendant contends that Section 77-35-16 (c) 
[sic] requires a showing of good cause for a grant of 
discovery due the State. It is the Court's opinion that it is 
good cause that Plaintiff's counsel is able to be prepared, to 
be ready to make a presentation, and get to the truth. No 
additional showing of good cause is necessary. Therefore, the 
State's Motion for Discovery is granted. 
That ruling is contrary to law. Defendant acknowledges that 
the District Court has broad discretion to grant or refuse 
discovery. See State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). This 
ruling, however, is not properly in exercise of that discretion, as 
it is without justification or reference to a specific situation. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in 1989. Prior to that time, rules of criminal 
procedure were set by the legislature. The Utah Supreme Court took 
over the rule making authority, adopting many of the previous 
statutes regarding criminal rules, verbatim. There have been no 
substantive changes to Rule 16 since its adoption, though there has 
been substantial discussion. In a meeting of the Supreme Court 
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Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, proposed 
amendments to the rule were introduced by the Statewide Association 
of Public Attorneys of Utah. Minutes of several meetings of this 
committee are included with this brief as Addendum C. A 
subcommittee was created to study the proposals. The draft 
proposal bears the date of July 28, 1993. Under the proposal, 
defense counsel would be required to grant the kind of discovery 
that has been sought here by the prosecution. That would include 
the names and addresses of witnesses, together with written or 
recorded statements or existing memoranda of oral statements. 
Discovery would also include physical evidence, such as documents. 
Additionally, written notices of various defenses would be 
required. Present rules, of course, require that notice be given 
for an alibi defense and for an entrapment defense. Notice of 
expert witnesses must be given, pursuant to statute. The suggested 
changes, however, would give the State considerably more rights to 
discovery than have existed in Utah traditionally. 
The rule requiring more discovery, was discussed at some 
length at a meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, on 
February 14, 1994. The Minutes of the meeting refer to some of the 
highlights of the "very spirited discussion", referred to below. 
Changes in the rule were discussed again at a committee 
meeting held on March 14, 1994. On April 11, 1994, a draft 
proposal, including some additional changes, was passed on to the 
committee, and voted on. The Minutes of that meeting state that 
"the Motion carried unanimously." 
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Nevertheless, that action was not final. In the minutes of 
the Advisory Committee of May 8, 1995, it was reported that, after 
the draft rule was made and proposed, a number of comments were 
received. Objections came from the Attorney General's Office, as 
well as the Office of Legislative Counsel. The rule was sent back 
to the sub-committee for further recommendations. 
In a meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, held on 
August 14, 1995, the committee voted to discontinue efforts to 
modify Rule 16. As far as can be determined, no substantial 
efforts have been made to modify this rule, since 1995. 
In effect, the motion for discovery filed by the State in this 
matter appears to be based on the proposed changes in Rule 16. The 
order granting that discovery seems to be based on the same 
premise. The problem, of course, is that the amendments were never 
made. While some sentiment existed, particularly among prosecuting 
attorneys, for a widened scope of discovery from the defense, the 
committee ended up being opposed to such changes. 
The Minutes of the meeting of February 14, 1994, refer to 
various concerns, especially among defense attorneys. Some of 
those statements are as follows: 
Brooke Wells believed that disclosing witnesses is as closely 
tied to disclosing defenses, as witnesses may also disclose 
defenses. She stated that disclosing defenses will help the 
prosection firm its case. She stated that this is a shifting 
of the burden onto the defense. She stated that the burden on 
defense counsel will be undo[sic], as prosecutors will always 
have more resources. Ms. Wells stated that most of her cases 
are won on reasonable doubt, and defense has no obligation to 
help with reasonable doubt. 
Mary Corporon noted that the system is not intended to lock 
people up, and it is designed to make the government overcome 
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significant burdens in order to prove its case. She also 
noted that the defense's case may not be set until trial, or 
until the prosecution rests its case. 
Todd Utzinger stated that he was having a problem with the 
distinction between alibi and other defenses and requested 
that someone in the committee attempt to provide him with an 
explanation. Mr. Utzinger also saw a concern in having police 
and go out and rattle witnesses who have been disclosed. 
Defendant concedes that some other states have required more 
discovery than has Utah; and she also concedes that there are 
arguments in favor of such changes in the Utah system. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee reviewed these 
changes, proposed some, reviewed the comments, and then abandoned 
the effort to amend the rule. The prosecutor in this matter, with 
the assistance of the Judge, has modified the rule independently, 
and without any of the safeguards of the rule making system. The 
Court, in making its finding that "It is good cause that 
Plaintiff's counsel be able to be prepared, to be ready to make a 
presentation, and to get to the truth" is no statement of good 
cause at all. What the trial court has done is accepted the 
proposed modifications, without going through the formalities. The 
rule making power is vested in the Supreme Court of this State, not 
in the individual District Courts. The rules are designed to be 
uniform, and clear and understandable to an attorney who practices 
in one county and travels across the county line to defend a client 
in another county. This counsel has practiced defense law since 
1973, and has never seen a unilateral rule change such as this in 
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any prior case. The trial court's order granting blanket discovery 
to the prosecution must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to the written and recorded statements 
she gave while pursuing her Internal Affairs complaint against the 
arresting officer. The State's discovery request is too broad , 
and without a showing of good cause, and so cannot be granted as 
requested. 
DATED this Q *^""day of August, 2000. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
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the office of Scott Keith Wilson, Assistant Utah Attorney, 160 East 
300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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ADDENDUM 
Order denying Defendant's discovery and granting 
Plaintiff's discovery. 
Letter from South Salt Lake denying copies of Defendant's 
Internal Affairs Complaint and her taped statement. 
Minutes of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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